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INTRODUCTION
Symposiums supply a snapshot in time. By observing the common
assumptions and shared frameworks of a collection of scholars, writing
contemporaneously, one gains both insight into the intellectual world of a past era
and the ability to measure its distance from our own. Twenty five years ago the
Virginia Law Review organized a noted symposium to celebrate the 50th
Anniversary of the SEC (the “1984 Symposium”).1 A number of prominent
scholars participated,2 and its articles have been much cited.
Now, we are at it again. Unlike then, however, there is a difference in the
mood. The natural superiority of the U.S. model for securities regulation is no

*

Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law and F. Arnold Daum Chair in Corporate Finance and
Law respectively. The authors wish to thank participants at the Virginia Symposium as well as Jill
Fisch and Steve Wallman for their comments. For research assistance, thanks goes to Paul
Justensen and Tyler Leavengood.
1
See “Fifty Years of Securities Regulation: Symposium on Contemporary Problems in
Securities Regulation,” 70 Va. L. Rev. 545-873 (1984). The Virginia Law Review earlier
memorialized the SEC’s “silver” anniversary in 1959. See Louis Loss, Contemporary Problems in
Securities Regulation, 45 Va. L. Rev. 787 (1959) and accompanying articles. Id. at 787-1072.
2
In alphabetical order, the participants included Professor Allison Gray Anderson, John
C. Coffee, Jr., Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R. Fischel, Ronald J. Gilson, Edmund W. Kitch,
Reinier H. Kraackman, Saul Levmore and Walter Werner. SEC Chairman John Shad provided the
Introduction, and Donald L. Calvin of the New York Stock Exchange also participated.
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longer an article of faith. Rather, much of the world believes they have been
caught in a financial crisis because of an illness that began in the U.S. housing
market but that has been exported to the rest of the world by U.S.-based financial
intermediaries. This article will move from an examination of the SEC’s
responsibility for that crisis to a discussion of how financial regulation should be
structured for the future.
A quarter century ago, the outlook was more optimistic. The market
seemed self-correcting, and the need for regulation was perceived as at most
modest. Revealingly, in the 1984 Symposium, little, if anything, was said about
globalization or technology (indeed, the Internet was not then known), but these
proved to be among the most dynamic and destabilizing forces that have shaped
the intervening era. Nor was much attention given to comparative law. The U.S.
system of securities regulation was implicitly assumed to be the template for the
rest of the world to emulate. Finally, securities regulation was not viewed as part
of a broader system of financial regulation, but as an alternative means of
influencing corporate governance. Federalism – i.e., the allocation of power
between state and federal regulators – received much attention,3 but not the
parallel allocation of authority among federal financial regulators. No one asked:
why is it that the SEC is an independent agency and not an arm of the Treasury
Department or the Federal Reserve? Today, these ignored issues – globalization,
technology, comparative institutional structure, and the place of securities
regulation within financial regulation generally – dominate the current discussion.
What did receive primary attention back then? Above all, the 1984
symposium demonstrated the new ascendancy of finance theory. The Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis (“ECMH”) was at stage center and the zenith of its
acceptance, with a number of authors arguing that it implied that law should play
only a secondary and severely constrained role. Others explained that markets
worked, less because of law or the threat of liability, but rather because
information was produced, collected, verified and disseminated by “reputational
intermediaries” – investment banks, auditors, securities analysts, and credit rating
agencies – who pledged their reputational capital behind their opinions and
judgments.4 Hence, these intermediaries would have little incentive to
misrepresent or distort.5 For most participants in the 1984 Symposium,
deregulation was the appropriate response to this “modern” recognition of the
3

Professors Anderson and Kitch expressly debated the implications of Federalism for the
SEC’s authority. Compare Alison Gray Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the
Securities Exchange of 1934, 70 Va. L. Rev. 813 (1984) with Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision
of the Securities Laws, 70 Va. L. Rev. 857 (1984). Federalism is, of course, the opium of the law
professors, which they can rarely avoid, even if there is nothing new to be said.
4
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 549, 604-05, 619-21 (1984).
5
Thus, a few years later, Judge Frank Easterbrook, a participant in the 1984 Symposium,
declared in an opinion that, because auditors would lose more in reputational capital than they
could gain in audit fees from a dishonest client, it would be “irrational for any of them to have
joined cause with” such a client. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young 901 F. 2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
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market’s efficiency, and, not surprisingly, a major shift towards deregulation was
then very much in progress.
So how much distance separates then from now? Today, the bloom is
clearly off the rose of finance theory. Intellectual paradigms have shifted over the
interim, as a new generation of “behavioral economists” have come to view the
ECMH more skeptically, emphasizing in particular the limits of arbitrage.6
Deregulation is no longer the presumptive policy prescription; indeed today, the
sense is growing that the current crisis may have been deepened by excessive
deregulation, which a process of international regulatory arbitrage arguably
enforced.7 Similarly, the naiveté behind the view that markets are always quickly
self-correcting because of the efforts of reputational intermediaries now seems
apparent.8 “Reputational intermediaries” proved to have their own biases and to
be highly vulnerable to issuer pressure. Yet, they remain indispensible because
there are simply a number of contexts where investors cannot themselves
undertake the verification and evaluative tasks that these experts perform.
Today, we term these specialized intermediaries “gatekeepers,”9 and their
repeated failure has dominated public attention. In 2002, Congress responded to
the conflicts surrounding auditors by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, largely to
replace private self-regulation of the auditing profession with public regulation.10
Also in that year, the major investment banks entered into a Global Settlement

6

For leading works in this field, all raising challenges to the ECMH, see generally
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler, ed., 1993); Robert J. Shiller,
MARKET VOLATILITY (1991); Andrei Shleifer, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: An Introduction
to Behavioral Finance 10-23 (2000). Of course, many scholars continue to defend the ECMH. See
Paul G. Mahoney, Is There A Cure for “Excessive Trading”?, 81 Va. L. Rev. 713, 718-21 (1995).
7
A vigorous debate is in progress over whether firms and financial institutions are
migrating away from U.S. markets to less regulated foreign markets (most notably London).
Compare Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rene M. Stulz, “Has New York Become Less
Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13079) (2007) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982193)
(finding New York has held at least even with London as a venue for foreign listings) with Comm.
On Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation at
2-6 (2006) (finding U.S. has suffered a decline in competitiveness). Regardless of the empirically
correct answer to this question of decline, U.S. policy makers have been bombarded since the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 with advice and predictions that stricter regulation will
entail a flight by regulated entities to less demanding markets (with London being the usual
asserted beneficiary of this flight).
8
Indeed, Professors Gilson and Kraakman, writing in 2003, have conceded their
“naiveté” on this point. See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Symposium: Revisiting the
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:
The Hindsight Bias, 28 Iowa J. Corp. L 715, 736-37 (2003).
9
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS: The Professions and Corporate
Governance (Oxford University Press 2006).
10
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat 745 (2002)
(creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a non-profit corporation
whose board is accountable to the SEC for adopting and enforcing regulations of public
accountants).
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with the New York State Attorney General, the SEC, and other securities
regulators, adopting prophylactic reforms and Chinese Walls to protect the
integrity of another gatekeeper, the securities analyst.11 More recently, the
subprime mortgage debacle has amply demonstrated the failure of still another
gatekeeper: the credit rating agency.12 If there is a common theme linking these
events, it is probably that self-regulation has severe limitations and seems to work
best only when the self-regulator’s duties are clearly demarcated (and it enforces
what this article will term “rules” rather than “principles.”)
Viewed panoramically, the most obvious developments over the interval
since 1984 have probably been the rapid succession of market crashes and
scandals. These seem disproportionate in both frequency and severity to prior
periods in U.S. financial history. To be sure, the market crash in 1987 now seems
an isolated event that proved little (other than that the unexpected can happen).
But repeated waves of scandals have followed: the 2000 Dot.Com crash, the
2001-2002 accounting irregularity scandals that culminated in the bankruptcy of
Enron and WorldCom, the New York Attorney General-led investigation of
securities analyst conflicts of interest that resulted in a global settlement in 2003,
the 2003-2004 “market timing” scandal involving mutual funds, the stock option
backdating investigation that began in 2006, and lastly and, most importantly, the
current financial crisis that first surfaced in the U.S. housing market in 2007, then
spread to derivatives, and has now paralyzed most major financial institutions. All
came in rapid succession, revealed pervasive misconduct by “reputational
intermediaries,” and have shaken market confidence. If once the rest of the world
looked to the SEC for leadership on issues of securities regulation, that presumed
leadership is in question today.
A related consequence of these scandals has been that a new layer of
financial regulation has developed over the last decade in the United States: state
regulators now have become important players in major financial scandals. While
state regulators were important prior to the enactment of the federal securities
laws, they had become peripheral players by 2000.13 Their resurgence may have
11

COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 265–66. New York’s Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer discovered widespread abuse of investment bank research analysts’ power. In exchange
for more business, these research analysts manipulated their findings to produce favorable ratings
for their investment bank clients. Spitzer and his staff discovered internal emails written by
research analysts at Merrill Lynch that exposed the fraud. In April 2002, Spitzer settled with
Merrill Lynch for $100 million. Soon thereafter, the SEC, NYSE, and NASD investigated other
large investment banks and found similar fraud. In April 2003, Spitzer settled with 10 major
underwriting firms for $1.3875 billion. Id. See also, Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten (?)
Partners in Fraud, 73 Cin. L. Rev. 139 (2004) (discussing Spitzer’s role in uncovering the
investment banking issues and analyzing the resulting settlements).
12
For a discussion of credit rating agencies as gatekeepers and why they failed, see
Coffee, supra note 9, at 34, 283-98.
13
See Howard M. Friedman, The Impact of NSMIA on State Regulation of BrokerDealers and Investment Advisers, 53 Bus. Law. 511 (1997). The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act (NSMIA) significantly impacted the role of federal and state regulators and
enforcers in dealing with securities offerings and professionals. Id. at 511. The NSMIA pre-
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begun with Eliot Spitzer, but it shows no signs of ending with his political demise.
Not surprisingly, the financial industry has not welcomed this new activism by
State Attorney Generals and would be happy to constrain or preempt them.
Reorganization of financial regulation could provide political cover for legislation
curbing the reach of state regulators.14 But the broader policy question first needs
to be addressed: To what extent is competition among regulators desirable?
This question inevitably leads to another: what responsibility does the
SEC bear for this succession of scandals and bubbles? Did the SEC and Congress
move too sweepingly in dismantling investor protections? Each episode is
different, and little consensus is likely, but one common denominator may link
them: the impact of rapid financial deregulation. This wave of deregulation began
with the SEC’s adoption of shelf registration in 1982 and continued with the
passage of a series of statutes – the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in
1995, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. In the background, the gradual de
facto repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act throughout the 1990s, culminating in the
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), also contributed.
Today, this trend toward deregulation has slowed or halted, and the SarbanesOxley Act in 2002 and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 certainly
show that Congress will again turn to regulatory solutions, particularly when
concerned about the conduct of gatekeepers.
Were there regulatory failures over this time period? Or would any system
that stifled the “animal spirits” of the market have involved greater cost? Again,
sharp disagreements are inevitable because attitudes toward regulation have
polarized since 1984. Until the current crisis struck, critics of regulation had been
arguing that the U.S. was losing its capital market competitiveness because it was
taking a more aggressive posture towards regulation, and particularly towards
enforcement, compared to the other major capital markets.15 At one pole in this
debate, some academics even urged that issuers should be able to choose both the
corporate and securities law applicable to them, opting from an inventory that

empted many state regulations and transferred many enforcement responsibilities from the states
to the federal government. In states that have not adopted regulations to mirror the NSMIA, for
example, state enforcers cannot take any action to prosecute offenders. Instead, they must wait for
the SEC or one of the SROs to step in. Id. at 522–23; see also G. Phillip Rutledge, NSMIA…One
Year Later: The States’ Response, 53 Bus. Law. 563, 570–74 (1997) (discussing the NSMIA’s
impact on states and how states are responding to the new shift in regulatory authority).
14
There are proposals to this effect in the U.S. Treasury Department’s recent “Blueprint.”
See The Department of Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
(2008) at 20 and 172 [hereinafter Treasury Report].
15
See Comm. On Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation (2006). Popularly known at the “Paulson Report,” this document does
conclude that the United States’s more stringent regulatory policies have injured its international
competitiveness. Id. at 2-6.
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would include at the least the corporate and securities laws of the major markets.16
Such choice, it was argued, would drive a process of regulatory arbitrage until, in
theory, the optimal level of regulation was reached. The current crisis is likely to
mute this demand for investor choice, because in a world of collapsing and
insolvent financial institutions, few favor giving them the right to choose their
level of supervision, and regulatory arbitrage inherently reduces the intensity of
regulatory oversight. The first lesson of the current crisis is that externalities
result when a financial institution fails; hence, shareholders cannot be given
unconstrained choice. In turn, a precondition of international competitiveness is
that a country’s financial institutions be able to survive a crisis. Conversely, the
current crisis also challenges those who favor stronger regulation and
enforcement. Why did the crisis begin, and largely devastate the financial
landscape, in the United States, which has long had much more aggressive public
and private enforcement? If enforcement works, the U.S. should seemingly have
been spared.
Both those who favor and those who oppose increased financial regulation
can agree on one thing: the current organization of financial regulation in the
United States is inefficient or worse. Almost no one likes the status quo. The level
of dissatisfaction with the current regulatory model was clearly evidenced by the
response to the recent report of the Treasury Department, entitled “Blueprint for a
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” (the “Blueprint”).17 The Blueprint
recommended both (1) a fundamental reorganization and consolidation of all
financial regulators in the United States, and (2) a major shift towards a more
deregulatory style that emphasizes reliance on “principles” (rather than “rules”)
and self-regulation by the industry. Much like a Rohrsach test, the Blueprint
predictably drew mixed and revealing reactions. Few endorsed its specific
recommendations; some feared that its proposed reallocation implied the demise
of the SEC,18 but most agreed that it would and should trigger a necessary debate
over structural reform. This article analyzes the Blueprint’s proposals, but in
terms of its own very different assessment of where financial regulation has gone
awry.
The consensus today is that the U.S. has a highly fragmented and arguably
Balkanized structure of financial regulation, which approaches creating a different
regulator for every class of financial institution. But what feasible alternatives
exist? Part I of this article surveys the different patterns of financial regulation

16

See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998). To be sure, Professor Romano does not expressly discuss
the special case of financial institutions, but her prescription of investor choice is unqualified, and
choice as to disclosure rules is not fundamentally different from choice as to other regulatory
regimes.
17
See The Department of the Treasury, supra note 14.
18
For such a view, see Julie Satow, “Will Bernanke Doom the SEC?,” New York Sun,
July 11, 2008 at p. 1 (expressing view that Federal Reserve oversight of investment banks would
eclipse the SEC).
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that have recently emerged in the other major capital markets and the failures that
sparked these recent changes. Part II will then return to the U.S. and ask a simple
but unavoidable question: why have there been so many recent scandals? What
failures do they suggest within the U.S. regulatory system? This discussion sets
the stage for an examination of the major proposals in the Treasury Department’s
Blueprint. Part III will specifically focus on the Blueprint’s proposal that U.S.
financial regulation should move to a more “principles-based” system and away
from its alleged current fixation on rules. Part IV will similarly examine the
Blueprint’s contention that U.S. financial regulation should rely to a greater extent
on self-regulation by private bodies, such as stock exchanges, which would adopt
rules from broad generic principles promulgated by the securities regulator.
Uniting the Blueprint’s separate strands is a common underlying theme:
to maintain U.S. capital market competitiveness, the U.S. should relax its
traditionally aggressive enforcement policies, either by relying more on broad
principles and self-regulation by the industry, or by delegating at least some
aspects of oversight and enforcement to industry self-regulation. This article
rejects this argument as unpersuasive and highly ideological; indeed, it views such
an attitude as a cause of the current crisis.
Nevertheless, this article concludes that the Blueprint is correct on a
critical point: regulatory consolidation is necessary. Unfortunately, progress on
that score may be slow. After all, it took over twenty years for Congress to
dismantle the Glass-Steagall Act, even though, over much of that period, the
Act’s obsolescence (and eventually its irrelevance) was apparent to most. The
Blueprint’s call for a re-allocation and consolidation of regulatory responsibilities
does make sense, even if implementation of any reforms will be slow. The
immediate focus should be on the SEC, itself: what does it do well – and less
well? Based on this evaluation, we will conclude with suggestions for a reallocation of authority between the SEC and other financial regulators that moves
the “prudential” supervision of the “safety and soundness” of investment banks to
banking regulators, but maintains and consolidates within the SEC authority for
consumer protection and oversight of business practices.
Part I: Regulatory Modernization: A Brief Tour of Recent Developments
Organizationally, financial regulation in the major capital markets today
follows one of three basic models:
A. The Functional/Institutional Model
The Blueprint repeatedly refers to the United States as having a “current
system of functional regulation, which maintains separate regulatory agencies
across segregated functional lines of financial services, such as banking,

7
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insurance, securities and futures.”19 This is at best a partial truth. In fact, the U.S.
falls considerably short of even a “functional” regulatory model. By design,
“functional” regulation seeks to subject similar activities to regulation by the
same regulator. Its premise is that no one regulator can have, or easily develop,
expertise in regulating all aspects of financial services. Thus, the securities
regulator understands securities, while the insurance regulator has expertise with
respect to the very different world of insurance. In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 (“GLBA”), which essentially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress
endorsed a system of functional regulation in more or less these words.20
Nonetheless, the reality is that the United States actually has a hybrid
system of functional and institutional regulation.21 The latter approach looks not
to functional activity, but to institutional type. Institutional regulation is seldom
the product of deliberate design, but rather of historical contingency, piecemeal
reform, and gradual evolution.
To illustrate this difference between functional and institutional
regulation, let us hypothesize that, under a truly functional system, the securities
regulator would have jurisdiction over all sales of securities, regardless of the type
of institution selling the security. Conversely, let us assume that under an
institutional system, jurisdiction over sales would be allocated according to the
type of institution doing the selling. Against that backdrop, what do we observe
today about the allocation of jurisdiction? Symptomatically, under a key
compromise in GLBA, the SEC did not receive authority to oversee or enforce the
securities laws with respect to the sale of government securities by a bank.22
Instead, banking regulators retained that authority. Similarly, the definitions of
“broker” and “dealer” in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were carefully
crafted by GLBA to leave significant bank securities activities under the oversight
of bank regulators and not the SEC.23 Predictably, even in the relatively brief time
since the passage of GLBA in 1999, the SEC and bank regulators have engaged in

19

Blueprint at 4 and 27.
The Conference Report to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act clearly states this:
“Both House and Senate Bills generally adhere to the principle of
functional regulation, which holds that similar activities should be regulated by
the same regulator. Different regulators have expertise at supervising different
activities. It is inefficient and impractical to expect a regulator to have or
develop expertise in regulating all aspects of financial services.” See H.R. Rep.
No. 106-434, at 157 (1999).
21
For this same assessment, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner and Michael Tayler, United
Kingdom and States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38
Tex. Int’l L. J. 317, 328 (2003).
22
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. Section 78(c)(a)(34)(G), and 15 U.S.C.
Section 78o-5(g)(2).
23
See 15 U.S.C. Section 78(c)(a)(4) and (5).
20
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a continuing turf war over the scope of the exemptions accorded to banks from the
definition of “broker” and “dealer.”24
None of this should be surprising. The status quo is hard to change, and
regulatory bodies do not surrender jurisdiction easily. As a result, the regulatory
body historically established to regulate banks will predictably succeed in
retaining much of its authority over banks, even when banks are engaged in
securities activities that from a functional perspective should belong to the
securities regulator.
“True” functional regulation would also assign similar activities to one
regulator, rather than divide them between regulators based on only nominal
differences in the description of the product or the legal status of the institution.
Yet, in the case of banking regulation, three different federal regulators oversee
banks: national banks are supervised by the Office of the Controller of the
Currency (“OCC”); state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System are overseen by the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) and state-chartered
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System but are federally
insured are supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).25
Balkanization does not stop there. The line between “banks,” with their three
different regulators at the federal level, and “thrifts,” which the Office of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”) regulates, is again more formalistic than functional and
reflects a political compromise more than a difference in activities.
Turning to securities regulation, one encounters an even more unique
anomaly: the United States has one agency (the SEC) to regulate securities and
another (the Commodities Future Trading Commission) to regulate futures. The
world of derivatives is thus divided between the two, with the SEC having
jurisdiction over options, while still a third category of derivatives – swaps – was
placed by Congress in 2000 largely beyond the reach of both agencies. No other
nation does anything like this. Finally, some major areas (for example, insurance)
simply have no federal regulator. By any standard, the United States thus falls
well short of a system of functional regulation.
Sensibly, the Blueprint proposes to rationalize this crazy-quilt structure of
fragmented authority through merger and consolidation of agencies. Specifically,
it proposes both a merger of the SEC and CFTC and a merger of the OCC and the
OTS. Alas, such mergers are rarely politically feasible, and to date, no
commentator (to our knowledge) has predicted that these proposed mergers will
occur.

24

See Kathleen Day, “Regulators Battle Over Banks: Three Agencies Say SEC Rules
Overstep Securities-Trading Law,” Wash. Post, July 3, 2001, at E3. Eventually, the SEC backed
down in this particular skirmish and modified its original position. See Securities Exch. Act
Release No. 34-44570 (July 18, 2001).
25
This is all well described in the Blueprint. See Blueprint at 31-41.
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Thus, although the Blueprint proposes that we move beyond functional
regulation, the reality is that we are not even there yet, as our existing financial
regulatory structure is organized at least as much by institutional category as by
functional activity. Disdaining a merely “functional” reorganization under which
banking, insurance, and securities would each be governed by their own regulator,
the Blueprint instead envisions a far more comprehensive consolidation of all
these specialized regulators. Why? In its view, the problems with functional
regulation are considerable:
“A functional approach to regulation exhibits several inadequacies,
the most significant being the fact that no single regulator
possesses all the information and authority necessary to monitor
systemic risk, or the potential that events associated with financial
institutions may trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults
that affect the financial system so significantly that the real
economy is adversely affected.”26
But beyond these concerns about systemic risk, the Blueprint has a deeper
anxiety: regulatory reform is necessary to maintain the capital market
competitiveness of the United States.27 In short, the Blueprint is designed around
two objectives: (1) the need to better address systemic risk and the possibility of
a cascading series of defaults, and (2) the need to enhance capital market
competitiveness. As discussed later, the first concern is legitimate, but the second
involves a more dubious logic.
B. The Consolidated Financial Services Regulator
A clear trend is today evident towards the unification of supervisory
responsibilities for the regulation of banks, securities markets and insurance.28
Beginning in Scandinavia in the late 1980s,29 this trend has recently led the
United Kingdom, Japan, Korea, Germany and much of Eastern Europe to move to
a single regulator model.30 Although there are now a number of precedents, the

26

Blueprint at 4.
In particular, the Blueprint hypothesizes that the U.K. has enhanced its own
competitiveness by regulatory reforms, adopted in 2000, that are principled-based and rely on self
regulation for their implementation. Id. at 3.
28
For recent overviews, see Ellis Ferran, Symposium: Do Financial Supermarkets Need
Super-Regulators? Examining the United Kingdom’s Experience in Adopting the Single Financial
Regulator Model, 28 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 257 (2003); Jerry W. Markham, A Comparative Analysis
of Consolidated and Functional Regulation: Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of
Securities and Derivative Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28
Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 319 (2003); Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine D. Noia, Financial Market
Regulation and Supervision: How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 463
(2003).
29
Norway moved to an integrated regulatory agency in 1986, followed by Denmark in
1988, and Sweden in 1991. See D. Giorgio & D. Noia, supra note 28, at 469-478.
30
See Bryan D. Stirewalt & Gary A. Gegenheimer, Consolidated Supervision of Banking
Groups in the Former Soviet Republics: A Comparative Examination of the Emerging Trend in
27
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U.K. experience stands out. It was the first major international market center to
move to a unified regulator model,31 and the Financial Services and Markets Act,
adopted in 2000, went significantly beyond earlier precedents towards a “nearly
universal regulator.”32 The Blueprint focuses on the U.K.’s experience because it
believes that the U.K.’s adoption of a consolidated regulatory structure “enhanced
the competitiveness of the U.K. economy.”33
Do the U.K.’s recent reforms provide a legitimate prototype for the
Blueprint’s proposals? Here, the Blueprint may have doctored its history. By most
accounts, the U.K.’s adoption of a single regulator model was “driven by countryspecific factors,”34 including the dismal failure of a prior regulatory system that
relied heavily on self-regulatory bodies but became a political liability because of
its inability to cope with a succession of serious scandals. Ironically, the financial
history of the U.K. in the 1990s has many parallels with the last decade of the
U.S.’s experience. On the banking side, the U.K. experienced two major banking
failures – the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”) in 1991 and
Barings in 1995. Each prompted an official inquiry that found lax supervision was
at least a partial cause.35
Securities regulation in the U.K. came under even sharper criticism during
the 1990s because of a series of financial scandals that were generally attributed
to an “excessively fragmented regulatory infrastructure.”36 Under the then
applicable law (the Financial Services Act of 1986), most regulatory powers were
delegated to the Securities and Investments Board (“SIB”), which was a private
body financed through a levy on market participants. However, the SIB did not
itself directly regulate. Rather, it “set the overall framework of regulation,” but
delegated actual authority to second tier regulators, which consisted primarily of
self-regulatory organizations (or “SROs”).37 Persistent criticism focused on the
inability or unwillingness of these SROs to protect consumers from fraud and
misconduct.38 Ultimately, the then chairman of the SIB, the most important of the

Emerging Markets, 23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 533 (2004). As discussed later, in some
countries (most notably Japan), the change seems more one of form than of substance, with little
in fact changing. See Markham, supra note 28, at 383-393 and 396.
31
See Ferran, supra note, at 258.
32
See Schooner and Taylor, supra note 21, at 329. Schooner and Taylor also observe that
the precursors to the U.K.’s centralized regulator, which were mainly in Scandinavia, had a
“predominantly prudential focus.” Id. at 331. That is, the unified new regulator was more a
guardian of “safety and soundness” and less oriented toward consumer protection.
33
Blueprint at 3.
34
Ferran, supra note 28, at 259.
35
Id. at 261-262.
36
Id. at 265.
37
Id. at 266. The most important of these were the Securities and Futures Authority
(“SFA”), the Investment Managers’ Regulatory Organization (“IMRO”), and the Personal
Investment Authority (“PIA”).
38
Two scandals in particular stood out: the Robert Maxwell affair in which a prominent
financier effectively embezzled the pension funds of his companies and a “pension mis-selling”
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SROs, acknowledged that self-regulation had failed in the U.K. and seemed
unable to restore investor confidence.39 This acknowledgement set the stage for
reform, and when a new Labour Government came into power at the end of the
decade, one of its first major legislative acts (as it had promised in its election
campaign) was to dismantle the former structure of SROs and replace it with a
new and more powerful body, the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”).
Despite the Blueprint’s enthusiasm for the U.K.’s model, the structure that
the Blueprint proposes for the U.S. more resembles the former U.K. system than
the current one. Under the Blueprint’s proposals, the securities regulator would be
restricted to adopting general “principles-based” policies, which would be
implemented and enforced by SROs.40 Arguably, the Blueprint envisions more or
less the model that failed in the U.K.
C. The “Twin Peaks” Model
As the Blueprint recognizes, not all recent reforms have followed the U.K.
model of a universal regulator. Some nations – most notably Australia and the
Netherlands – have instead followed a “Twin Peaks” model that places
responsibility for the “prudential regulation of relevant financial institutions” in
one agency and supervision of “business conduct and consumer protection” in
another.41 The term “twin peaks” derives from the work of Michael Taylor, a
British academic and former Bank of England official. In 1995, just before
regulatory reform became a hot political issue in the U.K., he argued that financial
regulation had two separate basic aims (or “twin peaks”): (1) “to ensure the
soundness of the financial system,” and (2) “to protect consumers from
unscrupulous operators.”42 Taylor’s work was original less in its proposal to
separate “prudential” regulation from “business conduct” regulation than in its
insistence upon the need to consolidate responsibility for the financial soundness
of all major financial institutions in a single agency.43 Taylor apparently feared
that if the Bank of England remained responsible for the prudential supervision of

controversy in which highly risky financial products were inappropriately sold to pension funds
without adequate supervision or disclosure. Id. at 267-268.
39
Id. at 268.
40
See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
41
Id. at 3. For a recent discussion of the Australian reorganization, which began in 1996
(and thus preceded the U.K.), see Schooner and Taylor, supra note 21, at 340-341. The Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) is the “consumer protection” agency under this
“twin peaks” approach, and the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (“APRA”) supervises
bank “safety and soundness.” Still, the “twin peaks” model was not fully accepted in Australia as
ASIC, the securities regulator, does retain supervisory jurisdiction over the “safety and soundness”
of investment banks. Thus, some element of functional regulation remains.
42
Michael Taylor, TWIN PEAKS: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century (Centre
for the Study of Financial Institutions 1995) at i (Executive Summary). For a quick review of
Taylor’s work, see Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, The Fed’s New Model of Supervision for
“Large Complex Banking Organizations”: Coordinated Risk-Based Supervision of Financial
Multinationals for International Financial Stability, 18 Transnational Lawyer 283, 295-296 (2005).
43
Lichtenstein, supra note 42, at 295.
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banks, its independence in setting interest rates might be compromised by its fear
that raising interest rates would cause bank failures for which it would be blamed.
In part for this reason, the eventual legislation shifted responsibility for bank
supervision from the Bank of England to the FSA.
It approaches the self-evident to note that a conflict exists between the
consumer protection role of a universal regulator and its role as a “prudential”
regulator intent on protecting the safety and soundness of the financial institution.
The goal of consumer protection is most obviously advanced through deterrence
and financial sanctions, but these can deplete assets and ultimately threaten bank
solvency. When only modest financial penalties are used, this conflict may sound
more theoretical than real. But, as discussed later, the U.S. is distinctive in the
severity of the penalties it imposes on financial institutions. In recent years, the
SEC has imposed restitution and penalties exceeding $3 billion annually and
private plaintiffs received a record $17 billion in securities class action
settlements in 2006.44 Over a recent ten year period, some 2,400 securities class
actions were filed and resulted in settlements of over $27 billion (and attorneys’
fees of approximately $7 billion), with much of this cost (as in the Enron and
Worldcom cases) being borne by investment banks.45 If one agency were seeking
both to protect consumers and guard the solvency of major financial institutions,
it might find it a very difficult balancing act to achieve both goals and also assure
a skeptical public that it had not been “captured” by its regulated firms.
Even in jurisdictions adopting the universal regulator model, the need to
contemporaneously strengthen enforcement has been part of the reform package.
Although the 2000 legislation in the U.K. did not adopt the “twin peaks” format,
it did significantly strengthen the consumer protection role of its centralized
regulator. The Financial Services and Markets Act, enacted in 2000, sets out four
statutory objectives, of which the fourth objective was the “reduction of financial
crime.”46 According to Michael Taylor, this represented “a major extension of the
FSA’s powers compared to the agencies it replaced,”47 and it reflected a political
response to the experience of weak enforcement by self-regulatory bodies, which
had led to the creation of the FSA.48 With probably unintended irony, Taylor and
a co-author have described this new statutory objective of reducing “financial
crime” as the “one aspect of U.K. regulatory reform in which its proponents
seems to have drawn direct inspiration from U.S. law and practice.”49
Conspicuously, the Blueprint ignores that “modernizing” financial regulation in
other countries has generally meant strengthening enforcement.

44

See text and notes infra at notes 54 and 95.
See Richard Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4
Berkeley Bus. L. J. 1, at *3 (2007).
46
See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, pt. 1, 6.
47
See Schooner and Taylor, supra note 21, at 335.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 336.
45
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D. A Preliminary Evaluation
Three preliminary conclusions merit emphasis:
First, whether the existing financial regulatory structure in the United
States is considered “institutional” or “functional” in design, its contemporary
impact seem clear: it invites regulatory arbitrage. Financial institutions position
themselves to fall within the jurisdiction of the most accommodating regulator,
and investment banks design new financial products so as to encounter the least
regulatory oversight. Such arbitrage can be defended as desirable if one believes
that regulators inherently overregulate, but not if one believes increased systemic
risk is a valid concern (as the Blueprint appears to believe).
Second, the Blueprint’s history of recent regulatory reform involves an
element of historical fiction. The 2000 legislation in the U.K., which created the
FSA as a nearly universal regulator, was not an attempt to introduce selfregulation by SROs (as the Blueprint seems to assume), but a sharp reaction by a
Labour Government to the failures of self-regulation. Similarly, Japan’s slow,
back-and-forth movement in the direction of a single regulator seems to have been
motivated by an unending series of scandals and a desire to give its regulator at
least the appearance of being less industry dominated.50
Third, the debate between the “universal” regulator and the “twin peaks”
alternative should not obscure the fact that both are “superregulators” that have
moved beyond “functional” regulation on the premise that, as the lines between
banks, securities dealers, and insurers blur, so regulators should similarly
converge. That idea will and should remain at the heart of the U.S. debate, even
after many of the Blueprint’s proposals are forgotten.
Part II: The U.S. Context: Has There Been a Regulatory Failure?
Whatever the trends elsewhere, a comparative survey of regulatory
consolidation and reorganization cannot tell us what the United States should do.
That is a prescriptive problem that simple description of changes elsewhere
cannot resolve. Moreover, as just noted, the closer one looks at structural reforms
in other major capital markets, the more one finds that they too were driven
mainly by country-specific events (i.e., scandals and politics), and not by general
theory.

50

Japan has a history and a regulatory culture of economic management of its financial
institutions through regulatory bodies that is entirely distinct from that of Europe or the United
States. Although it has recently created a Financial Services Agency, observers contend that it
remains committed to its traditional system of bureaucratic regulation that supports its large banks
and discourages foreign competition. See Markham, supra note 28, at 383-393 and 396.
Nonetheless, scandals have been the primary force driving institutional change there too, and
Japan’s FSA was created at least in part because Japan’s Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) had
become embarrassed by recurrent scandals.
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How then is the U.S. distinctive? And how should this influence the place
of securities regulation within the U.S. regulatory structure? In this section, we
briefly survey how the U.S. is different from Europe and then turn to the more
controversial topic: what responsibility should the SEC bear for recent scandals
and crashes. Here, we write against a backdrop where a legion of “law and
economics” scholars have launched tirades of criticism against the SarbanesOxley Act and fulminated generally about the costs of overregulation. Although
we do not mean to defend Sarbanes-Oxley against all criticism, we believe the
current subprime mortgage meltdown and the resulting “credit crunch” reveal that
there are costs to underregulation, and at present these latter costs may be greater.
A. How is the U.S. Different?
Of course, this involves restating some obvious points:
1. The Higher Level of Retail Ownership. Although institutional investors
may today dominate trading in the U.S. securities markets, the fact remains that
most U.S. households own equity securities, and nearly three-fourths of
Americans’ liquid financial assets are invested in securities-related products.51
This uniquely high level of individual ownership implies both a need for some
paternalism in securities regulation and the inevitability that there will be a
political demand for strong enforcement. Even the most closely comparable
securities market (namely, that of the U.K.) is significantly different. There,
securities ownership is much more concentrated in institutions, with a low and
declining level of individual ownership.52 Not surprisingly, when institutions
dominate the market, there is less demand for aggressive enforcement (because
today’s aggrieved victim may be tomorrow’s defendant). In such an environment,
regulators act primarily based on consensus and discipline primarily through
“regulatory frowns.”
2. The Tradition of Strong Enforcement. Whether measured in terms of
market capitalization or gross domestic product, the disparity between the levels
of financial penalties imposed by the SEC versus those imposed by regulators in

51

For an overview, see J. Coffee, J. Seligman, and H. Sale, SECURITIES
REGULATION: Cases and Materials (10th ed. 2007) at 3.
52
As of October 2008, the percentage of shares held by “private investors” (i.e., noninstitutional shareholders) in U.K. listed companies had fallen to 9.6% (which was consistent with
the level of such ownership in the 1980s, prior to later privatization efforts by the British
Government). See Matthew Vincent, “Value of private holdings hits low,” Financial Times,
October 19, 2008 at p. 15. At its peak, private ownership hit 20% in 1994. Id. During the 1990s,
the level of individual ownership rose as the result of the Thatcher Government’s privatization of
government-owned enterprises, but even this 20% level never approached the U.S. level of
individual ownership, which has not fallen below 30%. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and
U.K. Takeover Regulation 50–51 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No.
73, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928928 (comparing U.S. and U.K. institutional
ownership and revealing U.K. ownership in 2004 approximately 10% higher than U.S.).
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other major capital markets is extraordinary.53 In recent years, the SEC has
obtained penalties or financial restitution from defendants in amounts exceeding
$3 billion per year.54 In sharp contrast, the U.K.’s FSA imposed fines of only 5.3
million pounds in 2007, down from 13.3 million pounds in 2006.55 Thus,
comparing the SEC to its most closely comparable regulator, the FSA, the ratio in
recoveries seems to be nearly 300 to 1 in 2007 and probably around 100 to 1 for
most recent years. Moreover, the SEC is only one of several public enforcers in
the U.S. (FINRA and the states also impose large penalties and obtain
settlements). Finally, private enforcement obtains greater recoveries than public
enforcement. For example, in 2006, securities class action settlements peaked at
over $17 billion. Criminal enforcement of securities fraud cases is similarly
common in the U.S. and virtually unknown in Europe (in 2008, FSA brought the
first criminal cases for insider trading in its history).
Why does the U.S. display such greater enforcement intensity? The
answer may lie in its higher level of retail ownership (and a resulting greater
political demand for enforcement), or it may lie historically in the traditional
Populist skepticism of Wall Street, which goes back at least to the late 19th
Century (and possibly earlier). Curiously, the enforcement disparity seems to be
growing, even as U.S. and European corporate governance appear to be
converging in other respects.
This marked variation in enforcement intensity leads to an obvious policy
debate: Does the U.S. overenforce? Or, does the rest of the world underenforce?
In this light, we think the next factor is critical.
3. Equity Compensation. During the 1980s, the U.S. moved almost
overnight from a system in which senior managers were primarily compensated in
cash to one in which they were primarily compensated in equity (through stock
options). This change was partly driven by tax considerations and partly by
institutional investor pressure (as the institutions believed that senior management
was often too indifferent to their firm’s stock price). Whatever the reason, the
result was that corporate governance in the U.S. now uses a very high octane fuel
to incentivize managers. As a result, there may be far greater reason for senior
management in U.S. companies to seek to inflate earnings or understate liabilities
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For detailed comparisons, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of
Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229 (2007); Howell E. Jackson, Variations in the Intensity of
Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 253
(2007).
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In 2004, 2005, and 2006, the total of SEC obtained restitution, disgorgement and
penalties was, $3.1 billion, $3.1 billion and $3.275 billion, respectively. See Eric Zitzewitz, An
Eliot Effect? Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual Fund Settlement Negotiations, 2003-7,
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1091035 (April 21, 2008) at Table 1.
55
See Jonathan Sibun, “Tough-Talking Regulator Hands Out Smaller Fines,” The
Sunday Telegraph, December 30, 2007; “Watchdog Fines at Six-Year Low, as City Keeps to
Rules,” Yorkshire Post, December 31, 2007. The average fine in 2007 was 232,000 pounds and
only one fine was over one million pounds.

John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale

17

than for their counterparts in Europe to do so. This may be the common
denominator that best links the stock market scandals of 2001-2002 that led to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the debt markets crisis of 2008. Indeed, this
phenomenon of a compensation system that engenders a short-term orientation is
particularly strong within the finance industry where the combination of stock
options plus annual cash bonuses in the millions of dollars gives rise to
extraordinary pressures on managers to close deals at all costs. Arguably, senior
executives of U.S. financial institutions opted for higher levels of leverage over
the last decade, both because it enhanced short-term profitability and because a
risk-neutral stock market tolerated, and even demanded, acceptance of higher
levels of risk – even as the brink of insolvency was neared.
The ability of senior management in U.S. companies to pursue higher risk
policies follows not only from the differences in compensation but also from
differences in the structure of share ownership. Europe is characterized by
concentrated ownership; the U.S., by dispersed ownership and what Berle and
Means called the “separation of ownership and control.” In a concentrated
ownership system, the controlling owners are not diversified, and they can and do
monitor management, whereas in a dispersed ownership system, dispersed
shareholders are both more diversified and less able to monitor or constrain
management. Possibly because there are significant limitations on the ability of
dispersed shareholders to monitor, greater investment in public enforcement is
necessary to keep agency costs under control. Equally important, in a
concentrated ownership system, controlling shareholders generally have little
incentive to maximize the day-to-day stock price of their firm.56 Unlike managers
in a dispersed ownership system, they cannot simply exercise stock options and
dump the stock into the market, because by definition they hold large and illiquid
blocks and do not wish to increase their already undiversified position. Nor is it
likely that controlling shareholders plan to sell in the short-term. Even when they
do wish to sell, they will typically do so in privately negotiated control sales to an
incoming controlling shareholder at a premium that is not closely related to the
market price. For all these reasons, while controlling shareholders may overreach,
they typically have little reason to engage in short-term market manipulation.
B. What Went Wrong?: A Very Brief Tour of the Meltdown
Finger-pointing and blame allocation are time-honored academic
activities, which unfortunately have about the same social utility as locking the
barn door after the horse has been stolen. Nonetheless, before re-organizing
financial regulation from the ground up (as the Treasury’s Blueprint does), it is
essential to ask: What went wrong? What do these market and regulatory failures
indicate about the prerequisites for effective regulation?
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See Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 198 (2005).
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Where did the crisis begin? Although the deeper origins of the 2008
financial meltdown may lie in deregulatory measures, taken both by Congress and
the SEC, that placed some categories of derivatives and some entities beyond
effective regulation,57 most accounts start by describing the rapid inflation of a
bubble in the U.S. housing market. But the term “bubble” can be a substitute for
closer analysis and may carry a misleading connotation of inevitability. In truth,
bubbles fall into two basic categories: those that are demand-driven and those that
are supply-driven. Most bubbles fall into the former category,58 but the 2008
financial market meltdown was clearly a supply-driven bubble,59 fueled by the
fact that mortgage loan originators had come to realize that underwriters were
increasingly willing to buy portfolios of mortgage loans for asset-backed
securitizations without seriously investigating the underlying collateral.
The evidence is clear that between 2001 and 2006, an extraordinary
increase occurred in the supply of mortgage funds, with much of this increased
supply being channeled into poorer communities in which previously there had
been a high denial rate on mortgage loan applications.60 With an increased supply
of mortgage credit, housing prices rose rapidly, as new buyers entered the market.
But at the same time, a corresponding increase in mortgage debt relative to
income levels in these same communities made these loans precarious. Two
University of Chicago Business School professors have found that two years after
this period of increased mortgage availability began, a corresponding increase
started in mortgage defaults – in exactly the same zip code areas where there had
been a high previous rate of mortgage loan denials.61 They determined that a one
standard deviation in the supply of mortgages from 2001 to 2004 produced a one
standard deviation increase thereafter in mortgage default rates.62
Even more striking, however, is their finding that the rate of mortgage
defaults was highest in those neighborhoods that had the highest rates of
securitization.63 Not only did securitization correlate with a higher rate of default,
but that rate of default was highest when the mortgages were sold by the loan
57

Interestingly, this is the diagnosis that SEC Chairman Christopher Cox recently
presented to the Senate Banking Committee. See text and notes infra at notes 90 to 91. He stressed
the failure of Congress to give the SEC jurisdiction over investment bank holding companies or
over-the-counter derivatives (including credit default swaps).
58
For example, the high-tech Internet bubble that burst in early 2000 was a demanddriven bubble. Investors simply overestimated the value of the Internet, and for a time initial
public offerings of “dot.com” companies would trade at ridiculous and unsustainable multiples.
But full disclosure was provided to investors and the SEC cannot be faulted in this bubble – unless
one assigns it the very paternalistic responsibility of protecting investors from themselves.
59
This is best evidenced by the work of two University of Chicago Business School
professors discussed below. See Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, “The Consequences of Mortgage Credit
Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis, (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304)
(May 2008).
60
Id. at 11 to 13.
61
Id. at 18-19.
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Id. at 19.
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Id. at 20-21.
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originator to financial firms unaffiliated with the loan originator.64 Other
researchers have reached a similar conclusion: conditional on being securitized, a
loan portfolio that is more likely to be securitized defaults by about 20% more
than a similar risk profile loan portfolio that is less likely to be securitized.65
Why? The most plausible interpretation is that securitization adversely affects the
incentives of lenders to screen their borrowers.
Such a conclusion should not surprise. It simply reflects the classic “moral
hazard” problem that arises once loan originators do not bear the cost of default
by their borrowers. As early as March, 2008, The President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets issued a “Policy Statement on Financial Market
Developments” that explained the financial crisis as the product of five “principal
underlying causes of the turmoil in financial markets”:
“● a breakdown in underwriting standards for subprime mortgages;
● a significant erosion of market discipline by those involved in the
securitization process, including originators, underwriters, credit rating
agencies, and global investors, related in part to failures to provide or
obtain adequate risk disclosures;
● flaws in credit rating agencies’ assessment of subprime residential
mortgages . . . and other complex structured credit products, . . .
● risk management weaknesses at some large U.S. and European
financial institutions; and
● regulatory policies, including capital and disclosure requirements, that
failed to mitigate risk management weaknesses.”66
Correct as the President’s Working Group was in noting the connection
between the decline of discipline in the mortgage loan origination market and a
similar laxity among underwriters in the capital markets, it largely ignored the
direction of the causality. In retrospect, irresponsible lending in the mortgage
market appears to have been a direct response to the capital markets’ increasingly
insatiable demand for financial assets to securitize. If underwriters were willing to
rush deeply flawed asset-backed securitizations to the market, mortgage loan
originators had no rational reason to resist them.

64

Id.
See Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy K. Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, “Did
Securitization
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Lax
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Subprime
Loans,”
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Thus, the real mystery is not why loan originators made unsound loans,
but why underwriters bought them. Anecdotal evidence suggests that due
diligence efforts within the underwriting community slackened in asset-backed
securitizations after 2000.67 Others have suggested that the SEC contributed to
this decline by softening its disclosure and due diligence standards for assetbacked securitizations,68 in particular by adopting in 2005 Regulation AB, which
covers the issuance of asset backed securities.69 At this point, it becomes plausible
that failures in regulatory oversight, including by the SEC, may have played a
greater causal role in the debacle than has been generally emphasized (even if the
SEC had no responsibility or capacity to monitor the mortgage loan origination
process).
Still, any inquiry into why underwriters bought risky loan portfolios
without adequate due diligence or why the SEC narrowly defined the disclosure
obligations of issuers in securitizations defines the problem too narrowly. The
danger here is that one may “miss the forest for the trees.” If one takes instead a
broader “before and after” perspective, the most striking fact about this crisis is
that the United States, as of the beginning of 2008, had five major investment
banks that were not owned by a larger commercial bank: Merrill Lynch, Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. By the late Fall of
2008, all of these investment banks had either failed or abandoned their status as
independent investment banks. Two (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) had been
forced at the brink of insolvency to merge with larger commercial banks in
transactions orchestrated by banking regulators. One – Lehman Brothers – had
filed for bankruptcy, and the two remaining investment banks – Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley – had converted into bank holding companies under pressure
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Investment banks formerly relied on “due diligence” firms that they employed to
determine whether the loans within a loan portfolio were within standard parameters. These firms
would investigate and inform the underwriter as to the percentage of the loans that were
“exception” loans (i.e., loans outside the investment bank’s normal guidelines). Subsequent to
2000, the percentage of “exception loans” in portfolios securitized by these banks often rose from
the former level of 25% to as high as 80%. Also, the underwriters scaled back the intensity of the
investigations that they would authorize the “due diligence” firm to conduct, reducing from 30%
to as few as 5% the number of loans in a portfolio that it was to check. See Vikas Bajaj & Jenny
Anderson, “Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans,” N.Y. Times, January 12, 2008 at
p. A-1.
68
See Richard Mendales, “Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation
Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown And How To Fix It” (Working Paper 2008) at 36.
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See Securities Act Release No. 8518 (“Asset-Backed Securities”) (January 7, 2005), 79
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diligence obligation of underwriters by eliminating any need to assure that assets included in a
securitized pool were adequately documented. Professor Mendales has pointed out that
government sponsored entities, such as Ginny Mae, had required such documentation. See
Mendales, supra note 68, at 36. His point is that Regulation AB should have adopted the
procedures used by housing-related GSEs, such as Ginny Mae, which mandated quality control
procedures. Id.
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from the Federal Reserve Bank, thus moving from SEC to Federal Reserve
supervision.70 Each of these firms had survived prior recessions, market panics,
and repeated turmoil and had long histories extending back as far as the pre-Civil
War era. Yet, each either failed or was gravely imperiled within the same
basically six month period following the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008.
If their uniform collapse was not enough to suggest the possibility of
regulatory failure, one additional common fact unites them: each of these five
firms voluntarily entered into the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity (“CSE”)
Program, which was established by the SEC in 2004 for only the largest
investment banks.71 Indeed, these five investment banks were the only investment
banks permitted by the SEC to enter the CSE program. A key attraction of the
CSE Program was that it permitted its members to escape the SEC’s traditional
net capital rule, which placed a maximum ceiling on their debt to equity ratios,
and instead elect into a more relaxed “alternative net capital rule” that contained
no similar limitation.72 The result was predictable: all five of these major
investment banks increased their debt-to-equity leverage ratios significantly in the
period following their entry into the CSE Program, as shown by Figure 1 below:73
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For a concise overview of these developments, see Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Palette, and
Aaron Lucchetti, “Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out
Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2008 at p. A-1 (concluding that independent
investment banks could not survive under current market conditions and needed closer regulatory
supervision to establish credibility).
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See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-49830 (June 21, 2004), 69 FR 34428
(“Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities”).
72
The SEC’s “net capital rule,” which dates back to 1975, governs the capital adequacy
and aggregate indebtedness permitted for most broker-dealers. See Rule 15c3-1 (“Net Capital
Requirements for Brokers and Dealers”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1. Under subparagraph (a)(1)(i) of
this rule, aggregate indebtedness is limited to fifteen times the broker-dealer’s net capital; a
broker-dealer may elect to be governed instead by subparagraph (a)(1)(ii) of this rule, which
requires it maintain its net capital at not less than the greater of $250,000 or two percent of
“aggregate debit items” as computed under a special formula that gives “haircuts” (i.e., reduces
the valuation) of illiquid securities. Both variants place fixed limits on leverage.
73
This chart comes from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
Inspector General, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated
Entity Program (“Report No. 446-A, September 25, 2008) (hereinafter “SEC Inspector General
Report”) at Appendix IX at p. 120.
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That higher leverage, coupled with a high concentration of their assets in
subprime mortgages and related real estate assets, left them exposed and
vulnerable when market conditions soured in 2007-2008. For example, at the time
of its insolvency, Bear Stearns’ gross leverage ratio had hit 33 to 1.74
These facts may seem to corroborate a now popular hypothesis: excessive
deregulation by the SEC caused the liquidity crisis that swept the global markets
in 2008.75 The problem with this simple hypothesis is that it is just too simple.
Deregulation may well have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, but the
SEC’s adoption of the CSE Program in 2004 was not intended to be deregulatory.
Rather, the program was intended to compensate for earlier deregulatory efforts
by Congress that had left the SEC unable to monitor the overall financial position
and risk management practices of the nation’s largest investment banks. Still, if
the 2004 net capital rule changes were not intended to be deregulatory, they
worked out that way in practice. The ironic bottom line is that the SEC
unintentionally deregulated by introducing an alternative net capital rule that it
could not effectively monitor.
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See SEC Inspector General Report at 19.
For the strongest statement of this thesis, see Stephen Labaton, “S.E.C. Concedes
Oversight Plans Fueled Collapse,” New York Times, September 27, 2008 at p. 1. Nonetheless, this
analysis is oversimple. Although SEC Chairman Cox did indeed acknowledge that there were
flaws in the “Consolidated Supervised Entity” Program, he did not concede that it “fueled” the
collapse or that it represented deregulation. As discussed below, the SEC probably legitimately
believed that it was gaining regulatory authority from the CSE Program (but it was wrong).
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The events leading up to the SEC’s decision to relax its net capital rule for
the largest investment banks began in 2002, when the European Union adopted its
Financial Conglomerates Directive.76 The main thrust of the E.U.’s new directive
was to require regulatory supervision at the parent company level of financial
conglomerates that included a regulated financial institution (e.g., a broker-dealer,
bank or insurance company). The E.U.’s entirely reasonable fear was that the
parent company might take actions that could jeopardize the solvency of the
regulated subsidiary. The E.U.’s directive potentially applied to the major U.S.
investment and commercial banks because all did substantial business in London
(and elsewhere in Europe). But the E.U.’s directive contained an exemption for
foreign financial conglomerates that were regulated by their home countries in a
way that was deemed “equivalent” to that envisioned by the directive. For the
major U.S. commercial banks (several of which operated a major broker-dealer as
a subsidiary), this afforded them an easy means of avoiding group-wide
supervision by regulators in Europe, because they were subject to group-level
supervision by U.S. banking regulators. But U.S. investment banks had no similar
escape hatch, as the SEC had no similar oversight over their parent companies.
Thus, fearful of hostile regulation by some European regulators,77 U.S. investment
banks lobbied the SEC for a system of “equivalent” regulation that would be
sufficient to satisfy the terms of the directive and give them immunity from
European oversight.78 For the SEC, this offered a serendipitous opportunity to
oversee the operations of investment bank holding companies, which authority the
SEC had sought for some time. Following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act,
the SEC had asked Congress to empower it to monitor investment bank holding
companies, but it had been rebuffed. Thus, the voluntary entry of the holding
companies into the Consolidated Supervised Entity program must have struck the
SEC as a welcome development, and Commission unanimously approved the
program without any partisan disagreement.79
But the CSE Program came with an added (and probably unnecessary)
corollary: Firms that entered the CSE Program were permitted to adopt an
alternative and more relaxed net capital rule governing their debt to net capital
ratio. Under the traditional net capital rule, a broker-dealer was subject to fixed
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See Council Directive 2002/87, Financial Conglomerates Directive, 2002 O.J. (L 35) of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial
conglomerate and amending Council Directives. For an overview of this directive and its rationale,
see Jorge E. Vinuales, The International Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A Case Study of
Equivalence as an Approach to Financial Integration, 37 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 1, at 2 (2006).
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Different European regulators appear to have been feared by different entities. Some
commercial banks saw French regulation as potentially hostile, while U.S. broker-dealers, all
largely based in London, did not want their holding companies to be overseen by the U.K.’s
Financial Services Agency (“FSA”).
78
See Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up Debt and Risk,” New
York Times, October 3, 2008 at A-1 (describing major investment banks as having made an
“urgent plea” to the SEC in April, 2004).
79
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-49830, supra note 71.
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ceilings on its permissible leverage. Specifically, it either had to (a) maintain
aggregate indebtedness at a level that could not exceed fifteen times net capital,80
or (b) maintain minimum net capital equal to not less than two percent of
“aggregate debit items.”81 For most broker-dealers, this 15 to 1 debt to net capital
ratio was the operative limit within which they needed to remain by a comfortable
margin.
Why did the SEC allow the major investment banks to elect into an
alternative regime that placed no outer limit on leverage? Most likely, the
Commission was principally motivated by the belief that it was only emulating
the more modern and advanced “Basel II” standards used by the Federal Reserve
Bank. To be sure, the investment banks undoubtedly knew that adoption of Basel
II standards would permit them to increase leverage (and they lobbied hard for
such a change). From the SEC’s perspective, however, it designed the CSE
Program to be broadly consistent with the Federal Reserve’s oversight of bank
holding companies, and it even incorporated the same capital ratio that the
Federal Reserve mandated for bank holding companies.82 In addition, the CSE
Program required its participants to maintain “tentative net capital” of at least $1
billion and to notify the Commission if tentative net capital fell below $5 billion.83
The difference may seem modest; the SEC may have been overreached, but it was
not “captured.” Still, this difference goes to the agency’s integrity.
So what went wrong? The SEC’s Inspector General examined the failure
of Bear Stearns and the SEC’s responsibility therefor and reported that Bear
Stearns had remained in compliance with the CSE Program’s rules at all relevant
times.84 Thus, if Bear Stearns had not cheated, this implied (as the Inspector
General found) that the CSE Program, itself, had failed. That seems fair enough,
but this conclusion still does not mean that the retention of the standard net capital
rule (with its 15:1 debt to net capital ratio) would have saved any of the CSE
Program’s investment banks from the liquidity crisis that enveloped them. A close
reading of the Inspector General’s report suggests that the real problem lay less in
the specific terms of CSE’s Program’s rules than in SEC’s staff inability to
monitor the participating investment banks closely or to demand specific actions
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1(a)(1).
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See Rule 15c3-1(a)(1)(i)(“Alternative Indebtedness Standard”), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-

See Rule 15c3-1(a)(1)(ii)(“Alternative Standard”), 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii).
This alternative standard is framed in terms of the greater of $250,000 or two percent, but for any
investment bank of any size, two percent will be the greater. Although this alternative standard
may sound less restrictive, it was implemented by a system of “haircuts” that wrote down the
value of investment assets to reflect their illiquidity.
82
See SEC Inspector General Report at 10-11. Under these standards, a “wellcapitalized” bank was expected to maintain a 10 percent capital ratio. Id. at 11. Nonetheless,
others have argued that Basel II “was not designed to be used by investment banks” and that the
SEC “ought to have been more careful in moving banks on to the new rules.” See “Mewling and
Puking: Bank Regulation,” The Economist, October 25, 2008 (U.S. Edition).
83
Id. at 11.
84
Id. at 10.
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by them. Basel II’s approach to the regulation of capital adequacy at financial
institutions contemplated close monitoring and supervision. Thus, the Federal
Reserve assigns members of its staff to maintain an office within a regulated bank
holding company in order to provide constant oversight. In the case of the SEC, a
team of only three SEC staffers were assigned to each CSE firm85 (and a total of
only thirteen individuals comprised the SEC’s Office of Prudential Supervision
and Risk Analysis that oversaw and conducted this monitoring effort).86 From the
start, it was a mismatch: three SEC staffers to oversee an investment bank the
size of Merrill Lynch, which could easily afford to hire scores of highly
quantitative economists and financial analysts, implied that the SEC was simply
outgunned.87
This mismatch was compounded by the inherently individualized criteria
upon which Basel II relies. Instead of applying a uniform standard (such as a
specific debt to equity ratio) to all financial institutions, Basel II contemplated
that each regulated financial institution would develop a computer model that
would generate risk estimates for the specific assets held by that institution and
that these estimates would determine the level of capital necessary to protect that
institution from insolvency. Thus, using the Basel II methodology, the investment
bank generates a mathematical model that crunches historical data to evaluate
how risky its portfolio assets were and how much capital it needed to maintain to
protect them. Necessarily, each model was ad hoc, specifically fitted to that
specific financial institution. But no team of three SEC staffers was in a position
to contest these individualized models or the historical data used by them. Thus,
the impact of the Basel II methodology was to shift the balance of power in favor
of the management of the investment bank and to diminish the negotiating
position of the SEC’s staff. The problem was less that Basel II’s criteria were
inherently flawed than that it was a sophisticated tool that was beyond the
capacity of the SEC’s largely legal staff to administer effectively.
The SEC’s Inspector General’s Report bears out this critique by describing
a variety of instances surrounding the collapse of Bear Stearns in which the SEC’s
staff did not respond to red flags that the Inspector General, exercising 20/20
hindsight, considered to be obvious. The Report finds that although the SEC’s
staff was aware that Bear Stearns had a heavy and increasing concentration in
mortgage securities, it “did not make any efforts to limit Bear Stearns mortgage
securities concentration.”88 In its recommendations, the Report proposed both that
the staff become “more skeptical of CSE firms’ risk models” and that it “develop
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Id. at 2.
Id. Similarly, the Office of CSE Inspectors had only seven staff. Id.
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Moreover, the process effectively ceased to function well before the 2008 crisis hit.
After SEC Chairman Cox re-organized the CSE review process in the Spring of 2007, the staff did
not thereafter complete “a single inspection.” See Labaton, supra note 78.
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Id. at ix.
86

25

26

Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?

additional stress scenarios that have not already been contemplated as part of the
prudential regulation process.”89
But is this proposal realistic? Can the SEC’s staff really hope to regulate
through gentle (or even less-than-gentle) persuasion? Unlike a prophylactic rule
(such as the SEC’s traditional net capital rule that placed a uniform ceiling on
leverage for all broker-dealers), the identification of “additional stress scenarios”
by the SEC’s staff does not necessarily lead to specific actions by the CSE firms;
rather, such attempts at persuasion are more likely to produce an extended
dialogue, with the SEC’s staff being confronted with counter-models and
interpretations by the financial institution’s managers.
Our sense that the SEC cannot negotiate successfully for voluntary
compliance in an area where the investment banks have strong economic interests
is confirmed by a similar assessment from the person with perhaps the most
recent experience in this area. In his September, 2008 testimony before a Senate
committee, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox emphasized the infeasibility of
voluntary compliance , expressing his frustration with attempts to negotiate issues
such as leverage and risk management practices with the CSE firms. In a
remarkable statement for a long-time proponent of deregulation, he testified:
“[B]eyond highlighting the inadequacy of the . . . CSE program’s
capital and liquidity requirements, the last six months – during
which the SEC and the Federal Reserve worked collaboratively
with each of the CSE firms . . . – have made abundantly clear that
voluntary regulation doesn’t work.”90
His point was that the SEC had no inherent authority to order a CSE firm to
reduce its debt to equity ratio or to keep it in the CSE Program.91 If it objected, a
potentially endless regulatory negotiation might only begin.
Ultimately, even if one absolves the SEC of “selling out” to the industry in
adopting the CSE Program in 2004, it is still clear at a minimum that the SEC
89

Id. at xi.
See Testimony of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, September 23, 2008 (“Testimony Concerning
Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities,
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions”), at p. 4 (available at www.sec.gov) (emphasis
added). Chairman Cox has repeated this theme in a subsequent Op/Ed column in the Washington
Post, in which he argued that “Reform legislation should steer clear of voluntary regulation and
grant explicit authority where it is needed.” See Christopher Cox, “Reinventing A Market
Watchdog,” The Washington Post, November 4, 2008 at A-17.
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Chairman Cox added in the next sentence of his Senate testimony: “There is simply no
provision in the law authorizes the CSE Program, or requires investment bank holding companies
to compute capital measures or to maintain liquidity on a consolidated basis, or to submit to SEC
requirements regarding leverage.” Id. This is true, but if a CSE firm left the CSE program, it
would presumably become subject to European regulation; thus, the system was not entirely
voluntary and the SEC might have used the threat to expel a non-compliant CSE firm.
90
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lacked both the power and the expertise to restrict leverage by the major
investment banks, at least once the regulatory process began with each bank
generating its own risk model. Motivated by stock market pressure and the
incentives of a short-term oriented executive compensation system, senior
management at these institutions affectively converted the process into selfregulation.
One last factor also drove the rush to increased leverage and may best
explain the willingness of some investment banks to relax their due diligence
standards: competitive pressure and the need to establish a strong position in a
new and expanding market. For the major players in the asset-backed
securitization market, the long-term risk was that they might be cut off from their
source of supply, as loan originators were acquired or entered into long-term
relationship with competitors. Needing an assured source of supply, some
investment banks (most notably Lehman and Merrill, Lynch) invested heavily in
acquiring loan originators and related real estate companies, thus in effect
vertically integrating.92 In so doing, they assumed even greater risk by increasing
their concentration in real estate and thus their undiversified exposure to a
downturn in that market. This need to stay at least even with one’s competitors
best explains the now famous line uttered by Charles Prince, the then CEO of
Citigroup in July, 2007, just as the debt market was beginning to collapse. Asked
by the Financial Times if he saw a liquidity crisis looming, he answered:
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get
up and dance. We’re still dancing.”93
In short, competition among the major investment banks can periodically
produce a mad momentum that sometimes leads to a lemmings-like race over the
cliff.94 This in essence had happened in the period just prior to the 2000 dot.com
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See Terry Pristin, “Risky Real Estate Deals Helped Doom Lehman,” N.Y. Times,
September 17, 2008 at C-6 (discussing Lehman’s expensive, multi-billion dollar acquisition of
Archstone-Smith); Gretchen Morgenson, “How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell,” N.Y.
Times, November 9, 2008 at B4-1 (analyzing Merrill Lynch’s failure and emphasizing its
acquisitions of loan originators).
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See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, “Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on BuyOuts,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e5011dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html.
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Although a commercial bank, Citigroup was no exception this race, impelled by the
high fee income it involved. From 2003 to 2005, “Citigroup more than tripled its issuing of
C.D.O.s to more than $30 billion from $6.28 billion. . . .” See Eric Dash and Julie Creswell,
“Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk” N.Y. Times, November 22, 2008 at 1, 34. In 2005 alone, the
New York Times estimates that Citigroup received over $500 million in fee income from these
C.D.O. transactions. From being the sixth largest issuer of C.D.O.s in 2003, it rose to being the
largest C.D.O. issuer worldwide by 2007, issuing in that year some $49.3 billion out of a
worldwide total of $442.3 billion (or slightly over 11% of the world volume). Id. at 35.
What motivated this extreme risk-taking? Certain of the managers running Citigroup’s
securitization business received compensation as high as $34 million per year (even though they
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bubble, and again during the accounting scandals of 2001-2002, and this process
repeated itself during subprime mortgage debacle. Once the market becomes hot,
the threat of civil liability – either to the SEC or to private plaintiffs in securities
class actions – seems only weakly to constrain this momentum. Rationalizations
are always available: “real estate prices never fall;” “the credit rating agencies
gave this deal a ‘Triple A’ rating,” etc. Explosive growth and a decline in
professional standards often go hand in hand. Here, after 2000, due diligence
standards appear to have been relaxed, even as the threat of civil liability in
private securities litigation was growing.95
As an explanation for an erosion in professional standards, competitive
pressure applies with particular force to those investment banks that saw assetback securitizations as the core of their future business model. In 2002, a critical
milestone was reached, as in that year the total amount of debt securities issued in
asset-backed securitizations equaled (and then exceeded in subsequent years) the
total amount of debt securities issued by public corporations.96 Debt
securitizations were not only becoming the leading business of Wall Street, as a
global market of debt purchasers was ready to rely on investment grade ratings
from the major credit rating agencies, but they were particularly important for the
independent investment banks in the CSE Program. Although all underwriters
anticipated high rates of return from securitizations, the independent underwriters
had gradually been squeezed out of their traditional line of business –
underwriting corporate securities – in the wake of the step-by-step repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act. Beginning well before the formal repeal of that Act in 1999,
the major commercial banks had been permitted to underwrite corporate debt
securities and had increasingly exploited their larger scale and synergistic ability
to offer both bank loans and underwriting services to gain an increasing share of
this underwriting market. Especially for the smaller investment banks (e.g., Bear
Stearns and Lehman), the future lay in new lines of business, where, as nimble
and adaptive competitors, they could steal a march on the larger and slower
commercial banks. To a degree, both did, and Merrill eagerly sought to follow in
were not among the most senior officers of the bank). Id. at 34. This is consistent with the earlier
diagnosis that equity compensation inclines management to accept higher and arguably excessive
risk. At the highest level of Citigroup’s management, the New York Times reports that the
primary concern was “that Citigroup was falling behind rivals like Morgan Stanley and Goldman.”
Id. at 34 (discussing Robert Rubin and Charles Prince’s concerns). Competitive pressure is, of
course, enforced by the stock market and Wall Street’s short-term system of bonus compensation.
The irony then is that a rational strategy of deleveraging cannot be pursued by making boards and
managements more sensitive to shareholder desires.
95
From 1996 to 1999, the settlements in securities class actions totaled only $1.7 billion;
thereafter, aggregate settlements rose exponentially, hitting a peak of $17.1 billion in 2006 alone.
See Laura Simmons & Ellen Ryan, “Securities Class Action Settlements: 2006, Review and
Analysis” (Cornerstone Research 2006) at 1. This decline of due diligence practices as liability
correspondingly increased seems paradoxical, but may suggest that at least private civil liability
does not effectively deter issuers or underwriters.
96
For a chart showing the growth of asset-backed securities in relation to conventional
corporate debt issuances over recent years, see J. Coffee, J. Seligman, and H. Sale, SECURITIES
REGULATION: Case and Materials (10th ed. 2006) at p. 10.
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their wake.97 To stake out a dominant position, the CEOs of these firms adopted a
“Damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead” approach that led them to make
extremely risky acquisitions. Their common goal was to assure themselves a
continuing source of supply of subprime mortgages to securitize, but in pursuit of
this goal, both Merrill Lynch and Lehman made risky acquisitions, in effect
vertically integrating into the mortgage loan origination field. These decisions,
plus their willingness to acquire mortgage portfolios well in advance of the
expected securitization transaction, left them undiversified and exposed to large
writedowns when the real estate market soured.
So where does this brief history leave us? Our contention is not that
excessive leverage and inadequate risk management policies were the sole causes
of the 2008 financial crisis. Much blame can also be fairly assigned to other
culpable parties, including the credit rating agencies and the Congress for
deregulating over-the-counter derivatives in 2000.98 Nor were the investment
banks alone in pursuing high leverage and de-emphasizing risk management
practices. The private equity firms and some hedge funds also experienced a
similar bubble and may yet in some cases face insolvency.99 But the unique fact
about financial institutions in general, and investment banks in particular, is their
fragility. They finance their business using short-term capital to hold long-term
illiquid assets. This mismatch exposes investment banks to liquidity crises, and, as
the crisis mounts, their counter-parties back away and refuse to trade with them.
This has happened before cyclically, well within the memory of the chief
executives running these institutions.100 Then as now, the SEC was not effective
in dealing with this problem.
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For a detailed description of Merrill, Lynch’s late entry into the asset-backed
securitization field and its sometimes frenzied attempt to catch up with Lehman by acquiring
originators of mortgage loans, see Gretchen Morgenson, “How the Thundering Herd Faltered and
Fell,” N.Y. Times, November 9, 2008, at BU-1. Merrill eventually acquired an inventory of $71
billion in risky mortgages, in part through acquisitions of loan originators. By mid-2008, an initial
writedown of $7.9 billion forced the resignation of its CEO. As discussed in this New York Times
article, loan originators dealing with Merrill believed it did not accurately understand the risks of
their field. For Lehman’s similar approach to acquisitions of loan originators, see text and note,
supra, at note 92.
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The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) largely withdrew
swaps and other over-the-counter derivatives from the regulatory jurisdiction of both the SEC and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (although both retained anti-fraud jurisdiction).
99
See Andrew Ross Sorkin and Michael J. de la Merced, “Debt Linked to Huge Buyouts
Is Tightening the Economic Vise,” N.Y. Times, November 3, 2008 at A-1 (discussing problems
with recent buyouts by private equity firms); Peter Lattman, Craig Karmin and Pui-Wing Tam,
“Private Equity Draws the Cold Shoulder,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2008 at C-1.
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In 1990, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., the parent company in a financial
conglomerate that included a large broker-dealer subsidiary, encountered a financial crisis and
became unable to roll over its commercial paper and its counterparites similarly declined to trade
with it. Its bankruptcy (and that of its broker dealer subsidiary) led Congress to enact the Market
Reform Act of 1990 to add Section 17(b) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. For a
review of this last major broker-dealer insolvency before the current crisis, see U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of the Inspector General, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and
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Others have suggested that SEC deregulation also resulted in inadequate
disclosure and insufficient due diligence.101 Here, we are less certain whether
abbreviated disclosure played a significant causal role, but relaxed due diligence
was symptomatic of this era. Even if we give the SEC the benefit of the doubt on
this score, the conclusion still seems inescapable that the SEC was an ineffective
monitor of leverage and risk management policies at financial institutions under
its jurisdictions, from at least the time of the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy in 1990
through the current crisis. Equally important, a major reason for its failure, as
SEC Chairman Cox has proclaimed,102 was the SEC’s need to rely on “voluntary”
cooperation and engage in extended negotiations with the investment banks over
an issue that was central to these banks’ profitability. This is hardly an
endorsement for the Blueprint’s call for greater self-regulation.
Perhaps, this may seem an academic criticism because the CSE Program is
today moribund, and the remaining investment banks have reconstituted
themselves as bank holding companies. But, for the future, the critical issue is
what agency or agencies should supervise hedge funds, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions that are “too big to fail.” Inherently, this involves two
issues: (1) Who should monitor the safety and soundness of these institutions –
the SEC or the Federal Reserve?; and (2) What role can safely be given to
industry self-regulation? Against this backdrop, we turn next to the Treasury’s
proposals.
Part III: Can Principles Replace Rules?
Recent discussions about reforming the SEC, including the Blueprint,
have been laced with earnest invocations of the superiority of “principles” as a
basis for any regulatory reform and a corresponding denigration of “rules-based”
regulation.103 The Blueprint stresses that a quick change to a principles-oriented

Related Entities: Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program (Report No. 446-B September 25,
2008) at 1. The foregoing SEC Inspector General’s Report found the Commission to have poorly
implemented the Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program that had been established pursuant to §
17(b) in response to the Drexel bankruptcy.
101
For this view, see Richard Mendales, supra note 68, Professor Mendales argues
convincingly that (1) the focus of disclosure should be on the quality of the collateral in the
securitized pool, not on the historical returns on mortgages, and (2) underwriters should be
required to perform sufficient due diligence to document all the loans in the pool. Regulation AB
did neither.
102
See text and notes supra at notes 90 to 91.
103
See, e.g., Jeremy Grant, US Firms Lobby for Regulation by Principles, Financial
Times, Sept. 16, 2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto091520071714553553
(praising the proposed switch to a principles-based regulatory regime because it would improve
both regulation enforcement and U.S. capital market competitiveness in the world); Adam Shell,
Paulson Criticizes Regulation, USA Today, Nov. 21, 2006, Money, at 4b (quoting Paulson as
saying that we must “rise above a rules-based mind-set…and adopt a more principles-based
approach”).
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system is vital to maintaining global competitiveness.104 The financial industry
generally agrees.105 Accordingly, this section reviews the literature on the
principles versus rules debate. Not surprisingly, we conclude, first, that our
current system maintains a subtler balance between the two than has generally
been recognized and, second, that without rules, enforcement, and any sense of
parity therein, would decline in ways that business would actually find
unpalatable.
The standard analysis – both legal and economic – has long recognized
that a principles-based system of regulation is broader and more fluid than its
rules-based counterpart. Where a rule delineates, ex ante, allowed conduct, a
principle provides a more general description of acceptable conduct.106 The
regulator charged with enforcing the principle decides, ex post, whether particular
conduct is acceptable and whether the conduct in question violates the
principle.107
This balance between the ex ante decision under a rule-based regime and
the ex post decision under a principle-based system is best illustrated by using the
example of alternative ways to regulate speed limits.108 A speed limit crafted as a
rule might prohibit driving above 70 miles an hour. Anyone who does so breaks
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See, e.g. Jeremy Grant, US Firms Lobby for Regulation by Principles, Financial
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the rule. That is as simple as it can get, and the regulator, or fact-finder, need only
find that the speed exceeded the limit and apply the penalty.
In contrast, a speed limit crafted as a principle might simply prohibit
driving at an excessive speed. This is even simpler to draft, but harder to apply.
Now, the fact finder must examine the relevant circumstances, which could
include many factors from weather to age, driving experience, and type of
vehicle, in order to determine what speeds are excessive. Different conditions
could yield different results. In addition, the fact finder would have to determine
the actual speed and then apply the condition-based principle to that speed. Over
time, one suspects that prosecutors, fearing reversal, might enforce the principlebased prohibition only in more egregious cases. Empirical observers might report
that prosecutions occurred only when some other factor (suspected drunk driving,
extreme high speed, or reckless driving behavior) was observed.
Clearly, the above described speed-limit rule is easier and less costly to
enforce than its principle counterpart. Because it is easy to apply, it is often said
to promote values like precision and certainty, equality and uniformity, and
predictability and transparency.109 Transparency and certainty are maximized
because the rule’s application leads to specific and known consequences.110 These
factors, in turn effect the way in which regulators decide whether to enforce
certain laws and how often.111 Clear and easy rules prompt easy, lower cost
enforcement.112
Still, these advantages are tempered by countervailing disadvantages. A
rule, because it is certain, does not allow for flexibility or substantive equality.113
It can be over- or under-inclusive, and can encourage behavior that is socially
irresponsible up to the line it draws.114 In addition, when times change, rules may
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See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 106, at 1688 (noting that rules promote “restraint of
official arbitrariness and certainty”). See also Schlag, supra note 106 at 384 (describing the
argument that the “sharp line” drawn by rules promotes certainty and understandability).
110
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See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 106, at 573 (arguing that rules become cheaper than
standards as the frequency of enforcement increases).
113
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need to change, but that process may be slow and costly, requiring in the case of
administrative regulations, promulgation, debate, and revision.115
In contrast, the speeding principle allows for flexibility.116 Here, if the
fact-finder determines the weather and lighting were sufficient to allow a speed of
70 miles per hour, then 70 it is. In alternative conditions, the allowed limit might
be 50. Drivers face uncertainty, but gain the ability to adapt their behavior to
changes in weather, car design, or circumstances. Further, a principle need not be
redefined when circumstances change, because the principle incorporates adaptive
flexibility upfront.
To be sure, flexibility has its downsides. Neither those trying to abide by
the law nor those doing the enforcing are certain what “it” is.117 Both have to
assess and interpret the principle.118 The regulator then has to attempt to enforce
its interpretation of the uncertain principle. Those with ample resources have
greater incentive to contest the principle’s application to them. The result can be
variation, more opportunities for manipulation and risky behavior, as well as
increased enforcement costs as regulators struggle to define the inappropriate
behavior and then enforce that standard on those who will argue the conduct was
not within the intended definition.119 As the simple speeding example makes
clear, this debate has multiple dimensions. Neither side wins, absolutely. The
right choice of a rule-based or principle-based system depends on the
circumstances. To the extent that a principle-based standard is more costly for the
regulator to enforce and to the extent that the regulator is resource constrained, a
principles-based system may result in less enforcement, lower penalties, and a
larger de facto zone of regulatory immunity for those subject to it.
Although the debate about rules and principles/standards often occurs as if
the two never overlap, in reality they usually coexist.120 Indeed, the use of the
term, “based,” as in “principles-based” or “rules-based” is illuminating. Most
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systems are really combinations of the two, with the major difference being the
location of the system’s center of gravity in one or the other system.121
The U.S. securities regime has obvious examples of both. Consider the
types of financial disclosures required by Regulation S-K. This telephone booklength regulation controls the disclosures that companies must make when
seeking to offer securities to the public and when crafting the required annual
reports. Regulation S-K operates by delineating specific required disclosures.
Many of its provisions also contain specific materiality thresholds, or rules.122 But
the certainty thereby afforded is undercut by Rule 12b-20 under the Securities
Exchange Act, which obligates an issuer to disclose “in addition to the
information expressly required to be included in a statement or report . . . such
further additional material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made
not misleading.”123 Thus, the SEC’s disclosure instructions backstop a series of
rules with a general principle. Not surprisingly, the SEC likes to wear both a belt
and suspenders.
Now consider Item 404 of Regulation S-K.124 It requires disclosure of
transactions exceeding $120,000 between the issuer and directors, officers, 5%
stockholders (as well as the family members of those groups). It also requires
disclosure of related entities in which these groups have an interest greater than
10%, at least when 10% is the materiality threshold for this provision.125 Here,
then, is an example of a precise disclosure rule. It is just one of many contained in
the Regulation S-K, which is one of the most lengthy Regulations the SEC has
promulgated.126
A requirement like that contained in Item 404 is clear. Because it is clear,
violations are more straightforward. Either a company discloses all of the required
transactions or it does not. Straightforward violations are easier to prove. If the
violation is easy to spot and prove, enforcing the regulation is also easy.127 Herein
lies the rub. Industry might well want a principles-based system because it is more
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difficult to enforce, and will, therefore, result in fewer enforcement actions.128
Rest assured, however, that more is involved in the debate. The next issue is that
of safe harbors.129
Contrast Item 404 – a quintessential example of a rule-based system –
with the way that industry has pressed for a safeharbor on the definition of
materiality. Material misstatements or omissions can, of course, result in
liability.130 The definition of the term “material,” thus determines when liability
arises. According to the Supreme Court, the key question in this definition is
whether a reasonable investor would care. Not all information is equal.
Information is material, however, if there is a “substantial likelihood that [a]
disclosure . . . would [be] viewed by [a] reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”131 This
judicial definition is a principle. In order to determine whether a misstatement is
material, you have to determine who the “reasonable” investor is, what
information that investor would find significant, and what information
appropriately constitutes the “total mix.” The result is uncertainty about the
principle’s reach.
Ironically, despite the vehement calls by industry for a shift to a
principles-based securities regime, it has long and inconsistently fought the use of
a principle for defining materiality, demanding instead a more specific “rule.”132
The arguments it deploys focus on certainty and consistency.133 The business
community wants a sharp-edged safe harbor so that it can make disclosure
decisions free of liability concerns.134 In short, the argument for a rule-based
approach to materiality is that industry needs to know for certain whether and
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Jenny Anderson, On Paper, Wall Street Gets Its Way, N.Y. Times, April 1, 2008,
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trading liability).
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See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 24, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)
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See, e.g., Basic supra note 29, at 236 (noting that support for a bright-line rule “seems
to be directed solely at the comfort of corporate managers”).

35

36

Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?

when to disclose. The SEC135 and the courts136 have expressed a preference for a
materiality principle, long declining to provide any bright-line rule and arguing
that to do so would likely encourage risky behavior, right up to any threshold
drawn.137
If Item 404 provides the classic illustration of a rule, then Rule 10b-5
provides an equally useful archetypal example of a principle-based regulation.138
Rule 10b-5 supplies the jurisdictional basis for most securities litigation and the
vast majority of the damages imposed on corporate issuers.139 For liability to
attach under Rule 10b-5, there must be a material misstatement or omission, made
with scienter, on which a person relies in purchasing or selling securities, and
which causes the person damages.140 Scienter is the element receiving the greatest
judicial attention. Case law interpreting it abounds. The issue is what level of state
of mind speakers must have before they can be held responsible for an alleged
material misstatement or omission.141
Here again, industry has regularly called for reform and pushed for
changes to increase certainty and predictability. In 1995, Congress responded with
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,142 which, among other changes,
provided for “heightened pleading” of scienter-based claims.143 The reforms were
designed to placate industry.144 The legislation resulted in significant increases in
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the dismissal of claims at the pleading stage as well as a continuing battle over
how to define scienter.145 After over a decade of litigation under the 1995 statute,
the Supreme Court finally jumped into the fray, again in response to complaints
about uncertainty.146 In 2007, the Court issued its Tellabs opinion that industry
praised147 and touted as clarifying the standard, or making it more rule-like. 148
But this praise may have been premature as the decision’s actual impact is
less clear. Early decisions have produced results that likely have surprised
industry. For example, on remand, the Seventh Circuit held in the Tellabs case
that the complaint survived the new-improved, more rule-like standard.149 As a
result, the case has now survived the motion to dismiss.150 Other cases have
reached a similar result.151 A possible message of these decisions may well be
that, under pressure, principles mutate into rules. That is, decision-makers try and
reduce the uncertainty surrounding a principle, and, as they do so, it becomes
easier to enforce – like the speed limit of 70 miles per hour.152
What do we learn from these examples? First, it is obvious that
straightforward rules tend to be easier to interpret and enforce. In part, the ease of
enforcement of rules may well account for the industry’s preference for a
principle-based system.153 Second, we learn that industry does not truly want a
principles-based system without substantial qualifications and exemptions.
Indeed, in some cases, industry has pushed for standards to migrate to the ruleend of the spectrum.154 Presumably, any quick shift to a principle-based system
would be accompanied by demands for bright-line rules in areas where litigation
and enforcement tend to occur, like materiality or 10b-5 fraud claims. Third, then,
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it appears that industry’s real interest is in a hybrid system. Yet, as we have just
seen, the U.S. disclosure regime is just that, a combination of rules and principles.
It is not alone. Most other systems, regardless of how they are touted, are also
hybrids.155
All this suggests that movement in either direction along the
rules/principles continuum is unlikely to provide any quick or easy fix to the U.S.
securities regime. Scrapping the entire system in favor of a new-and-improved
principles system would create uncertainty, not only because it was principlesbased, but also because it would be new. Indeed, a new system might well create
at least a short-term litigation boon, as lawyers attempted to “prosecute” cases
under the revised principles-based system.
Here, under the system of contingent fee motivated entrepreneurial
litigation that the U.S. has long and uniquely accepted, private attorneys can and
do obtain very large settlements in the course of enforcing the securities laws and
regulations.156 Industry presumably does not want an increase in such actions or
settlements, particularly when accompanied by a concomitant increase in
uncertainty about new principles. Thus, any discussions about reforms to the U.S.
system must include consideration of the environment in which securities
disclosure takes place and in which it is enforced. Our system emphasizes ex post
adjudication of fraud issues, chiefly through private securities litigation based on
Rule 10b-5 and a few other implied private causes of action.157 Although there
have been many proposals for reform and virtually everyone supports some
reform in principle,158 no specific proposal has yet achieved broad support.
Our concern is that any significant movement towards a truly principlesbased regulatory model will aggravate existing problems with private litigation.
Unless greater attention is given to the impact of these proposals on civil
litigation, the “solution” may well be worse than the “problem.” Here, the
Blueprint appears to fall short. Although it states various broad themes, it neither
addresses seriously the problems of consumer-protection, nor does it explain how
the principles-based regime would provide industry the protections it seeks. Good
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reform requires precisely that sort of attention, with a clearer focus on the U.S.
public and private enforcement environments, the role of class actions, and the
high level of retail ownership in the United States.159
If one recognizes that the goal of consumer protection must be balanced
against the goal of reducing abusive litigation,160 that balancing quickly becomes
exceedingly complex. Precisely for this reason, the tradeoffs in any reforms
should be explicit. One such tradeoff might be to determine whether industry
would prefer to refashion the ex ante, rule-based disclosure requirements into a
more principle-based system, with the ex post litigation enforcement provisions
remaining in place. Although that might mean that consumers would receive less
specific information about a particular company upfront, consumers would still
have an ex post principle-based enforcement remedy. Conceivably, we could trim
the Regulation S-K rules and refashion many of them as principles, enforceable
through a general anti-fraud prohibition that relied on a broad “principles-based”
definition of materiality. Industry would gain a principle-based disclosure system,
subject to ex post litigation and enforcement. We doubt, however, that such a
system would quickly gain a consensus of support.
Suffice it to say that these types of tradeoffs may explain why there are
cyclical debates about massive systemic reform, but only infrequent changes of
any consequence.161 As history reveals, politics intervenes.162 The result is fewer
changes than debates.163
Part IV: The Role of Self-Regulation
U.S. securities regulation is generally thought to promote a liquid and
efficient capital market.164 Part of its legitimacy comes from its enforcement
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system. Though many have debated whether U.S. enforcement, and in particular
private securities litigation, is excessive, all that can clearly be shown is that
enforcement is better funded and more rigorous in the United States than
elsewhere, not that it is excessive.165 Indeed, as Part II of this paper makes clear,
the United States has recently weathered a series of corporate frauds that do not
suggest that corporate decision-makers have been overdeterred. Any arguments
for reform, then, should fully address these issues. The Blueprint does not.
Despite the range of industry and gatekeeping failures documented in Part
II of this article, the Blueprint offers three proposals tied to regulation and
enforcement, which, to varying degrees, seek to allow industry to self-regulate
and seemingly will decrease enforcement. First, as discussed in Part III, the
Treasury Report urges a regulatory system based on core principles, but, as just
argued, a principles-based system will likely decrease enforcement. Second, the
Treasury Report urges preemption of state securities enforcement. State securities
regulators, however, have been important fraud detectors and arbitrators, who
have, at times created competition pressuring the SEC to take action.166 Third, the
Treasury Report asserts that the “ideal” regime would be one in which the federal
government’s role in fraud enforcement would diminish dramatically and the selfregulatory organizations, themselves public companies, would become the
enforcers and consumer protectors.167
To examine these proposals, it is important to focus more concretely on
what exactly would be delegated and to whom. Under the Blueprint, the
disclosure system currently in place would continue to be managed by a federal
body, the Corporate Financial Regulator.168 Thus, on some level, the consumer
protection afforded by the disclosure side of the system would remain in place.
Still, our mandatory disclosure system has long co-existed with a strong
anti-fraud rule. Disclosures must not be misleading, either affirmatively or by
half-truth or omission.169 Most recognize that fraud in the marketplace has
significant costs.170 Policing the market for fraud is thus important in order to
markets with those of other countries and showing how much more liquid the U.S. capital markets
are).
165
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promote consumer protection, liquidity and efficiency. In short, punishing fraud
allows for “public confidence” in the market.171 Shareholders and other market
monitors can make accurate investment decisions only if disclosures are
sufficiently fulsome and truthful.172 Fraud, of course, interferes with such
assessments and, thereby, decreases the accountability of managers.173 In
addition, over time, as markets become unreliable, shareholders will decline to
invest or will demand a higher premium because of the market’s tolerance of
fraud. When that occurs, liquidity decreases,174 and the cost of capital likely
increases.175 Of course, excessive deterrence may also reduce market efficiency
by leading corporate managers to be overly cautious in their forward-looking
statements or even to understate income.
Thus, from either perspective, fraud must be punished, but neither too
much nor too little, because serious errors are possible in both directions. When
courts or the SEC approach this issue of damage assessment, they usually analyze
the topic from one of two alternative perspectives: compensation or deterrence.176
In actual reality, compensation is only minimally achieved in today’s enforcement
and litigation world, and arguably properly so.177 Deterrence is also an elusive
target, but it can be imposed in two forms: through actual payment of civil
damages or other enforcement penalties or through litigation and its associated
costs. The Blueprint sidesteps the issue of private litigation, stating only that
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“implied private rights of action” are for the courts to determine.178 Further,
although much recent academic commentary has stressed the likely superiority of
public enforcement over private enforcement,179 the Blueprint takes precisely the
opposite approach, attacking, first, state and, then, federal enforcement, and
proposing to minimize both through delegation to the SROs.
The Blueprint’s assault on state enforcement is straightforward: It should
be preempted.180 This suggestion is not new.181 Industry has repeatedly urged
preemption of state securities law and enforcement.182 In fact, in 1997, NSMIA
did preempt much of the states’ securities regulatory apparatus for securities
traded in national markets, but it left state anti-fraud enforcement largely intact.183
In contrast, the Blueprint focuses not on state regulation in the sense of
rule-making and oversight, but on state enforcement of antifraud rules.
Increasingly, state Attorneys General have played an aggressive role in
prosecuting securities fraud and have pushed the SEC to be more vigorous in its
own enforcement efforts.184 The Blueprint’s proposal, however, would preclude
the New York Attorney General’s office from playing the central role that it
recently has. In support of such preemption, the Blueprint notes that the “current
multi-agency business conduct oversight structure creates uneven enforcement,
potential enforcement gaps, disputes over jurisdiction, and regulatory
inconsistency.”185 All that may be to some degree true, but such “multi-agency
oversight” also produces competition, which in turn leads to more aggressive
enforcement and fills gaps. Recent experience suggests that this is a form of
regulatory competition that actually appears to have worked. If one believes
securities fraud tends to be underenforced, competition is desirable and creates a
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failsafe check and balance against the prospect of regulatory capture. Even if one
believes the reverse, automatic preemption does not logically follow.186
Part II has already noted that then Attorney General Eliot Spitzer was
ahead of the SEC in the investigation of securities analyst conflicts and “market
timing” in mutual funds. The same can be said for the Enron investigation, where
he used New York’s unusually flexible securities law to investigate the role of the
investment banks in the Enron fraud.187 By all accounts, he was once again “out in
front of” the SEC and his investigations created pressure on the SEC to enter the
battle and insist on a settlement by the banks.188 Indeed, at the time of Spitzer’s
investigation, it was unclear whether the SEC intended to pursue the banks at all,
let alone aggressively.189
This phenomenon of the New York Attorney General stealing a march on
the SEC is not limited to the brief reign of Eliot Spitzer. More recently, his
successor, Andrew Cuomo, has been the most aggressive enforcer in the recent
auction rate securities cases, negotiating settlements with the major investment
banks totaling well over $50 billion.190 Earlier, Attorney General Cuomo reached
the first settlements with the credit rating agencies.191 Other Attorneys General
have also played a significant role, along with the SEC, in resolving similar these
cases.192
Not only have the State Attorneys General frequently been first, they have
often been tougher. A recent study of the restitution involved in mutual fund cases
is particularly revealing.193 It compares restitution in cases involving both the
New York Attorney General’s office and the SEC, with those involving the SEC
186
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alone.194 The study concluded that the cases with both “prosecutors” yielded
considerably higher restitution ratios.195 The study controlled for a variety of
factors to reach the conclusion that the higher restitution in the cases with the
New York Attorney General appear to be attributable to its relative
aggressiveness.196 Further, the study concludes that the “aggressiveness
explanation” is consistent with the career concerns of the regulator as well as with
regulatory capture theories.197
Under the system proposed by the Blueprint, the most that a State
Attorney General could do, if so inclined, would be to “suggest” an investigation,
or at least raise the question of one, with the various federal regulators and selfregulatory bodies. It could proceed further, however, only with their approval.198
The Blueprint also neglects to address the incentives of state regulators to
pursue such violations. The Zitzewitz study, however, makes clear that
accounting for those incentives is important.199 Career concerns and the favorable
publicity that accompanies such investigations appear to motivate (at least in part)
the decision to pursue them.200 Despite this fact, the Blueprint proposes that state
regulators be urged instead only to investigate and bring questions to the attention
of the federal regulators. Then, they should be content with walking away when
they are preempted from carrying the investigation through. Yet, as the Enron and
market-timing cases make clear, the state regulators have been important gapfillers in the existing system, with the competition benefitting the investors and
the market.
This does not mean that regulatory competition between state and federal
enforcers never produces problems or inconsistencies. But when it does, the more
politically accountable approach would be to force the SEC to take public action

194

See Zitzewitz, supra 193, at 4 (noting that settlements not involving the New York
Attorney General’s office had the lowest restitution ratios among those in sample).
195
See Zitzewitz, supra 193, at 4 (settlements involving New York had ratios of .78,
while those with the SEC alone, had ratios of .07).
196
See Zitzewitz, supra 193, at 4–6.
197
See Zitzewitz, supra 193, at 4–6.
198
Treasury Report supra note 14, at 180:
For example, given the experience of state officials with state-chartered financial
institutions or other locally based knowledge of business conduct issues (e.g., complaints
regarding certain business practices in local areas), state officials could bring these issues to
CBRA’s attention. Based upon that local information, state officials could be given the authority
to proceed with full investigations and enforcement actions if approved by CBRA. An alternative
to this grant of authority to state officials should be for CBRA (or the appropriate SRO) to use
such information to further investigate compliance issues and take enforcement actions as
necessary. In both cases, the goal should be to build off the local knowledge of state officials and
to provide an appropriate role for states in business conduct oversight.
199
Zitzewitz, supra note 193, at 4–5 (noting that when New York gets involved in
prosecuting a case, the restitution-to-harm ratio increases significantly and implies that New York
pursues such prosecution more aggressively).
200
Zitzewitz, supra note 193, at 30.

John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale

45

to preempt the state regulator. This both has political costs for the SEC (as it
should have) and adds transparency to the process. To simply assume that the
SEC would always resist state enforcement and desire its preemption seems an
extraordinarily arbitrary presumption. Thus, we will suggest an alternative
mechanism for resolving actual conflicts between state and federal enforcers in
the concluding section of this article.
Next, let us consider the distinct proposal of the Blueprint that most power
held by the SEC be delegated to the SROs. Despite an extraordinary recent
outpouring of criticism over the failure of the gatekeepers,201 the Blueprint never
even addresses this topic or the alleged enforcement capacity of the SROs. Nor
does it address the SRO failures that led the U.K. to replace self-regulation with
the FSA.202 Instead, in support for the proposal to shift responsibility to the
SROS, the Treasury Report offers the following bland paragraph:
A number of models could be considered to implement CBRA’s rule
writing, compliance, and enforcement responsibilities. CBRA could
employ a model, similar to the current approach in banking regulation,
under which it would be solely responsible for these functions. However,
given CBRA’s scope of responsibilities, that structure would not likely be
practical. CBRA could also employ, or in some instances be required to
employ, a structure similar to the current futures and securities regime that
relies on SROs for many aspects of regulatory implementation and
oversight. Given the breadth and scope of CBRA’s responsibilities, some
aspect of self-regulation should form an important component of
implementation. Given its significance and effectiveness, the current SRO
model for futures and securities should be preserved. That model could be
considered for other areas, or the structure could be flexible enough to
allow for certain modifications, such as maintaining rule writing authority
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with CRBA, while relying on an SRO model for compliance and
enforcement.203
The key rationale offered here for shifting enforcement to the SROs
appears to be the “breadth and scope of CBRA’s responsibilities.” If workload is
the problem, the logical answer would be to increase the staff and resources of the
federal agency, not to shift responsibility from a public enforcer to a private one.
Other than workload and a vague claim about the need to achieve
convergence,204 the Blueprint is devoid of a rationale for why the SROs should
absorb enforcement or, more importantly, why they would be good at it. Given
that fraud, or more properly, the lack thereof, is so important to the marketplace,
the question is a serious one.205 As Part III has emphasized, the recent experience
of the U.S. with an unparalleled level of fraud only adds to the importance of
making the right enforcement decision – and for the right reasons.206
The Blueprint’s silence on this question does not imply that serious
arguments could not be made in favor of greater reliance on SROs.207 To consider
these, let’s begin with an initial question: who are the SROs? The Blueprint
defines them to include the exchanges and the self-regulatory bodies for brokers
and dealers (now FINRA). Today, each exchange or market has its own set of
rules and regulations with which listed companies must comply.208 In 2007, the
NASD was consolidated with the listed company regulation, enforcement, and
arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange, resulting in FINRA.
According to FINRA’s website,
FINRA touches virtually every aspect of the securities business—from
registering and educating industry participants to examining securities
203
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firms; writing rules; enforcing those rules and the federal securities laws;
informing and educating the investing public; providing trade reporting
and other industry utilities; and administering the largest dispute
resolution forum for investors and registered firms. It also performs
market regulation under contract for The NASDAQ Stock Market, the
American Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange and the
Chicago Climate Exchange.209
Thus, it is fair to say that the key SROs are the exchanges, and FINRA, and
arguably the PCAOB, which serves as the SRO for auditing firms.210
Next, the more difficult and critical issue involves whether the SROs can
be effective enforcers against their own listed companies.211 The SRO listed
company rules are not particularly textured. Instead, they tend to be of a checkthe-box nature – i.e., classic “rules” with no hint of principles lurking beneath the
surface. For example, although both NASDAQ and NYSE/Euronext require some
committees of listed companies’ boards to be composed solely of independent
directors, the definitions of independence are based on narrow and highly specific
financial criteria.212 More fulsome disclosure might be warranted, but the listing
rules do not require it.
More importantly, exchanges are businesses. In theory, they have an
interest in creating rules and listing standards to attract investors.213 Attracting
investors attracts listed companies.214 As economic actors, then, exchanges should
understand that market integrity is important “in attracting business.”215
Companies want to list on efficient markets where they are likely to attract
investors.216 Again, in theory, these basic interests could, over time, lead the
SROs to develop rules and regulations to prevent fictitious transactions and
securities, as well as fraud and other types of market manipulation. Hopefully, the
SROs would want to promulgate regulations that promote their own reputations
and, thereby, garner business. The fact that today there are two highly
209
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competitive U.S. exchanges enhances this argument – competition should
encourage the development of efficient regulations.217
Arguably, the exchanges might also have some advantages in rulemaking.
They are close to the market and have informational advantages that the
government does not have.218 They would certainly have the opportunity to
develop regulations based on the information to which they have access and, in
particular, with respect to how the markets work. Perhaps relying on this view of
SRO’s advantages, the Blueprint urges that all SRO proposed rules be selfcertifying, rather than subject to the check and, arguably, balance, of government
approval.219
These are fairly straightforward economic arguments that have been made
many times before. But there are complications. For example, the arguments for
why exchanges and SROs make superior regulators sound much like the
arguments that used to be made for why gatekeepers never fail. Indeed, over time,
the more sophisticated proponents of SRO regulation have come to place less
emphasis on the investor protection side of the SROs’ regulatory function and
more on their need to attract listings.220 Further, today, even strong advocates of
eliminating some aspects of SEC rulemaking functions and private class actions
continue to stress public enforcement provisions.221
Perhaps the most important complication is that both the NYSE/Euronext
and NASDAQ are now public companies. Public companies face issues that
complicate their decision-making in ways that arguably make them ineffective
compliers, let alone regulators. Now add to that, under the Blueprint’s scheme,
that they would truly be self-regulating. They would set regulations, and enforce
them, for themselves and for their listed companies. The conflict of interest is
patent and is akin to the old adage of the “fox guarding the henhouse.”
In addition, the economic arguments in favor of having the SROs take on
these responsibilities rely significantly on reputation and market forces. Yet, these
factors may be generally less effective than assumed. As Marcel Kahan has
argued, exchanges have limited incentives to expose “bad” information about
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their listed companies.222 Information that casts the exchange in a negative light
will harm its ability to attract investors and other companies.223 If they have little
interest in disclosing their own problems, they will presumably have little
incentive to ferret information out in the first place.224 Thus, the reputational and
market forces cut both ways here – particularly with respect to enforcement.
Exchange-based enforcement may not be effective for other reasons as
well. Listing is voluntary. Listed companies who are dissatisfied have choices
(indeed that is part of the rationale for the Blueprint’s recommendations). An
obvious choice is to select a different exchange and with it a different regulatory
body, including a non-U.S. exchange and a non-U.S. regulator. This fear of the
foreign migration of listed companies may well create an incentive for the
exchanges, which are public companies themselves, from enforcing their
regulations aggressively. Yet, the social loss from “soft” regulation may exceed
the gains from attracting more listings. Investors may lose precisely as the
investment banks gain.225
In addition, because the SEC regulates many aspects of securities law, not
just those concerning the listed companies themselves, delegation to SROs
implicates the interests of third parties. To begin with an obvious fact, the SEC
has the power to regulate and sanction acts beyond those of listed companies and
members.226 For example, in 2007, the SEC preempted the exchanges from
adopting an “uptick” rule to regulate short selling, and in 2008 the SEC has
proposed regulations on “naked short selling.” Such regulations focus on traders
who are not necessarily exchange members (e.g., institutional investors, hedge
funds, etc.). Today, the exchanges no longer have effective power to control these
aspects of securities regulation. It seems a fair question to ask whether it would be
desirable to delegate power over these third parties to a public company that is
being regulated by itself. Arguably it could have an incentive to prevent any sort
of short-selling or speculative trading at all. The very concept of delegating such a
dramatic level of responsibility to a public company with a board focused on its
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own earnings, raises questions about outsourcing that deserve very serious
discussion. The Blueprint, however, ignores these issues entirely.
Finally, today, the exchanges target their enforcement efforts less at public
companies and more on broker-dealers. FINRA, the combined enforcement body
for NYSE/Euronext and NASDAQ is not, therefore, a “complete” enforcer.
Instead, it tends to occupy the broker/dealer field, leaving the other matters to the
SEC. Arguably, then, the SEC and FINRA have reached an efficient division of
labor that allows for specialization. Shifting the responsibility to the SROs
eliminates this division of labor and puts industry in charge of itself.
In sum, without any rationale other than CBRA’s workload, the Blueprint
suggests broad elimination of SEC and state-level enforcement powers in favor of
letting the regulated enforce against themselves. Yet, the exchanges currently rely
upon governmental assistance and the government’s power to deter fraud.227
Unquestionably, the exchanges would like the SEC to listen to their point of view
more attentively, and probably the SEC should be pushed to expedite its review of
proposed SRO rules (which has been a long-standing source of tension between
the SROs and the SEC but which it has promised to do). But regulations alone do
not a sufficient anti-fraud regime make. Instead, fraud-prevention requires
deterrence. Deterrence requires detection, and detection requires detectives with
the incentive to achieve outcomes. The current system is one of tripartite
enforcement – the exchanges do some, the SEC does some, and the states provide
valuable back up.228 The backup is key, because it provides a failsafe control
against regulatory capture. Although the exchanges may be able to play some role
here, hardcore fraud requires the intervention of an outsider.229 The Blueprint,
however, would replace the outsider with self-regulation by insiders.
Part V: Consolidation and Coordination
Although we have been to this point critical of the Blueprint for its
unsupported faith in self-regulation and the natural superiority of principles over
rules, those aspects of the Blueprint are essentially peripheral. Its core
contribution is to call forcefully for consolidation within a system of financial
regulation that is fragmented to the point of Balkanization. Moreover, the
Blueprint also makes an astute judgment in preferring a “twin peaks” or multiple
agency regulatory structure that places consumer protection, business conduct,
and disclosure regulation under one regulatory authority and traditional prudential
financial oversight (i.e., “safety and soundness” regulation) under another.230 In
227
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effect, the Treasury Department has followed Australia, rather than the U.K. – and
wisely so. One unified regulator, which is the U.K. model, places too many
responsibilities under one regulator, thereby masking the conflicts that can arise
between consumer protection and maintenance of bank solvency and soundness.
But if what one accepts the superiority of the “twin peaks” model, that still
leaves open the question of how regulatory authority should be allocated between
the two agencies. Specifically, assume that the Blueprint is influential and, acting
upon it, some future Administration resolves to pursue a “twin peaks” model that
assigns the SEC authority over disclosure, business conduct and consumer
protection, but gives some amalgam of the OCC and the Federal Reserve
authority over the safety and soundness of financial institutions. What
responsibilities might still migrate from one agency to the other? In Part A below,
we recommend that “prudential” regulatory authority over all financial
institutions be consolidated in the Federal Reserve/OCC successor. As the agency
which ultimately must fund bailouts for troubled financial institutions, it has the
best incentives to protect bank safety and soundness. As a practical matter, this
means that the SEC would largely surrender its authority to administer its “net
capital rule” and would instead look to the Federal Reserve to restrict excessive
leverage at investment banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds.
Part B addresses the problem of enforcement competition. Although we
have argued that state regulators should be encouraged and not preempted from
securities fraud enforcement, we recognize that a point can be reached where one
state regulator could take action under antifraud rules that did conflict with
important federal regulatory policies. Still, rather than preempt all state regulators
ex ante because of this potential conflict, we propose an alternative, and more
limited policy in Part B below that would apply on an ex post basis only.
A. Prudential Financial Regulation: Not the SEC’s Job
The SEC has administered its net capital rules from the agency’s outset.231
Why should it abandon this authority to banking regulators? Our answer is two
fold: (1) times have changed, and (2) banking regulators have the comparative
advantage because they focus on precisely these issues of risk and leverage over a
broad range of financial institutions.
Times have changed in several critical respects: First, as earlier discussed,
the major investment banks have either failed, merged with commercial banks, or
reconstituted themselves as bank holding companies. Today, most large broker
Currency, as well as that the SEC would not be merged into a unified financial regulator. We do
not address the specific form of consolidation that should occur among banking regulators.
231
Federal net capital standards for broker dealers have been administered by the SEC
since its inception in 1934, and the precursor of the current net capital rules, which are predicated
on Section 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, dates back to 1938. See L. Loss and J.
Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION (3rd ed. 1991) at 3128-3133. Rule 15c3-1 dates from
1975.
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dealers are part of a larger financial conglomerate, and their risk management
activities, capital adequacy, and operational status can be meaningfully
understood only on a consolidated, entity-wide basis. Indeed, the SEC recognized
this fact in 2004 when it put into place its “consolidated supervised entity” (CSE)
framework, which allowed broker-dealers and their holding companies to
voluntarily elect to be subject to SEC supervision with respect to capital adequacy
on a group-wide basis.232 The SEC recently abandoned the CSE program,
conceding its failure,233 and others have viewed it as an instance of regulatory
capture.234
The real issue for the future involves not investment banks, but hedge
funds and insurance companies, which are not seriously regulated at the federal
level today, but are similarly capable of destabilizing the financial system (as AIG
has surely proven). We propose that the regulatory consolidation give the Federal
Reserve authority to monitor and restrict the leverage of all financial institutions
that are “too big to fail.”
Second, the issue that most threatens the solvency of financial institutions
involves the explosive growth of over-the-counter derivatives, and in particular
credit default swaps.235 Bear Stearns was bailed out by the Federal Reserve, not
because it was too big to fail, but because it was too entangled to fail. It had
issued billions of dollars worth of credit default swaps, and its failure could
conceivably have set off a cascade of falling financial dominoes.
But if the growth of derivatives is the key weakness, the SEC is poorly
positioned to address or resolve this problem. Under Section 3A of the Securities
Exchange Act, the SEC is broadly denied authority over swap agreements in
sweeping language that even denies the SEC the ability to “recommend” or
“suggest” registration of derivatives236 or to impose “reporting or recordkeeping
requirements.”237 While the SEC has hesitated and even resisted greater
regulation of swaps, the Federal Reserve has consistently sought the
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Requirement for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities”) (June 8,
2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 34, 428.
233
Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept.
26, 2008) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm (quoting Chairman
Cox as saying that “voluntary regulation does not work”).
234
Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, New
York
Times
(Oct.
3,
2008)
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html?hp=&pagewanted=print,
235
See Press Release, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., Mid-Year 2008 Market
Survey Shows Credit Derivatives at $54.6 Trillion (Sept. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.isda.org/press/press092508.html (noting that the annual growth rate for credit
derivatives from mid-2007 to mid-2008 was 20 percent).
236
See Section 3A(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78c-1(b)(2).
237
See Section 3A(b)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78c-1(b)(3).

John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale

53

establishment of an industry-wide clearing house for the trading of over-thecounter derivatives.238
Third, banking regulators have the comparative advantage in this area.
Capital adequacy regulation, including the supervision of risk management, is the
core business of banking regulators. In the post-Basel II environment, their
personnel are highly trained in the latest techniques. The SEC is fundamentally a
disclosure regulator. As a result, it is questionable whether it has a sufficient
number of trained personnel to engage in in-depth oversight of capital adequacy.
Inherently too, the SEC will always have a “bottoms up” perspective, looking
through the regulated broker-dealer to its parent financial holding company,
whereas banking regulators have the superior “top down” perspective.
Fourth, it is open to question whether capital adequacy regulation would
ever become a major priority for the SEC. By culture and philosophy, the SEC is
a disclosure regulator, whose concerns with risk and leverage are generally
satisfied once full disclosure is made.
For the future, it seems obvious that financial regulators will need to
restrict leverage and risky trading practices at investment banks and other large
financial institutions. The agency best suited to accomplish this task is not the
SEC. Banking regulators have better skilled personnel (and more of them), better
information (acquired from their regulatory oversight of commercial banks and
other financial institutions), and greater power over their regulated institutions.
This does not mean that the SEC should be stripped of all power in this regard,239
and certainly the SEC should be consulted by the prudential regulator. But the
primary responsibility for determining capital adequacy should be given to the
prudential regulator, as the body with the greater experience and superior
resources.
B. State/Federal Relationships in a Competitive Environment
We have earlier argued that competition among enforcers is healthy and
has filled gaps in securities enforcement. But limits may need to be placed on this
competition. Consider a circumstance that briefly arose during New York
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Attorney General Spitzer’s settlement negotiations with Merrill Lynch and other
investment banks over conflicts of interest surrounding securities analysts. For a
time, Mr. Spitzer was convinced that the only appropriate remedy was a
prophylactic rule under which investment banks that underwrote securities would
be barred from employing securities analysts. The investment banks would
therefore be required to spin off or sell their research divisions to firms that did
not underwrite securities. Although the New York Attorney General was basically
armed only with a antifraud statute, that statute was liberally phrased and carried
criminal penalties.240 The pressure of high potential liability can coerce a
defendant to agree to virtually any non-pecuniary terms that reduced its financial
or criminal liability. Here, the financial industry’s fears are not without some
basis in fact.
To be sure, the point here is not the dubious wisdom of the above
described prophylactic rule (which ultimately the New York Attorney General
abandoned as ill-considered). Rather, it is that one state jurisdiction, if adamant,
might be able to impose terms and conditions that adversely impacted on the
national market. If the SEC did not want to compel the spin off of all securities
research and New York State did, the SEC’s judgment should control. To ensure
that the SEC retains this power, we would favor legislation authorizing the SEC to
take action ex post to invalidate any rule, regulation or order made by a state
securities regulator, or any provision in a settlement between state regulators and
defendants, that in the SEC’s judgment unreasonably restrained competition,
interfered with fair and orderly markets, impeded the national market system, or
was contrary to the public interest or the protection of investors.241 This power is
broad, but would not be unlimited. Most importantly, it would be an ex post
power, not a general prohibition on rule making or litigation. The SEC would,
however, be required to notify the state regulator and the market of its rationale
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for deeming the action contrary to the public interest or the protection of
investors.
The logic of this proposal is that the SEC is politically accountable and
should remain so. Were the SEC to take action invalidating a rule or settlement
reached by state regulators, it would be subject to political attack and criticism –
and properly so. State attorneys general are adept, possibly more adept than the
SEC, at mobilizing public opinion, and the press would predictably focus on the
case. As a result, Congressional oversight of the SEC’s actions would be highly
likely.
More importantly, under this provision, the SEC could not place some
topic or issue wholly off limits to state regulators, in effect preempting state
regulation. This broader preemption is what the Blueprint proposes and what we
have earlier criticized. Under our proposal, the SEC could preempt only specific
rules, regulations, or settlements – and only with a full public explanation from
the SEC as to why the action invalidated was contrary to the public interest or the
protection of investors. We submit that the SEC would use this power only
sparingly and that such an ex post power responds adequately to the danger that a
single state might take action on its own that adversely impacted competition or
the national market system.
CONCLUSION
What should we learn from this crisis?
First, financial institutions are fragile. Because they rely on short-term
liabilities to finance their holding of longer-term illiquid assets, they are
inherently likely to face liquidity crises in times of market stress.
Second, the incentives for financial institutions to seek to increase
leverage in order to enhance profitability are strong. This cycle is likely to repeat
itself, at least so long as financial managers remain incentivized to accept high
risk and “to keep dancing as long as the music is playing.”242
Third, in a bubbly market, it is easy to rationalize economizing on due
diligence and professional standards. But the long-term costs are high.
Fourth, simple rules typically work better than complex ones. Although a
prophylactic rule that places a ceiling on leverage (as the SEC’s standard net
capital rule did) has its costs, it is capable of effective implementation, while a
more optimal rule (in terms of its theoretical design) may be beyond the effective
capacity of many bureaucracies to implement.
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Against this backdrop, we believe that the Blueprint’s proposal to confine
the U.S. securities regulator to the promulgation of broad principles and leave it to
the SROs to issue specific rules implementing those principles, while also
preempting state enforcers, is precisely the wrong prescription. At most, we
propose the SEC be given a more limited ex post power to restrain state
regulators, but not to preempt them.
All this said, the Blueprint still makes an important contribution in calling
for the consolidation of financial regulators and by favoring the “twin peaks”
model of separating the consumer protection regulator from the “prudential” or
“safety and soundness” regulator. To limit excessive leverage and risky trading
practices, one must give a greater role to the prudential regulator. Precisely
because “prudential” regulation of leverage and risk requires the regulator to go
beyond disclosure and reach paternalistic judgments about what level of risk is
unsound, we doubt that the SEC is ideally suited to play this role. Neither its
culture nor its expertise incline it to go beyond its normal mandate of ensuring full
disclosure. It contrast, banking regulators can consider all major financial
institutions, including investment banks, from a common perspective and apply a
common standard. At such a task, we believe the Federal Reserve or similar
agency has the comparative advantage, is less exposed to capture, and can
outperform the SEC.
Important as the issues we have discussed are, we must close with the
nagging sense that they will still be the subject of debate when the Virginia Law
Review in due course convenes its “100th Anniversary of the SEC Symposium.”
Law reform is a marathon, not a sprint.

